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Article
The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year
MIKE KOEHLER
On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act enforcement. This article, part of annual series, highlights how 2016
witnessed the largest number of corporate enforcement action and largest
aggregate corporate settlement amounts in the FCPA’s nearly 40 year history.
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum of
enforcement actions. For instance, there were FCPA enforcement actions against
U.S. companies as well as foreign companies; enforcement actions that alleged
egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest levels of a company
as well as enforcement actions finding bribery based on allegations of “golf in the
morning and beer-drinking in the evening” and internship and hiring practices;
enforcement actions against large multinational companies as well as small
publicly-traded companies, privately-held companies and limited liability
companies; enforcement actions across a wide spectrum of industries such as
technology, oil and gas, pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial
services; and enforcement actions involving conduct across the globe from Latin
America to South America, to Eastern Europe to Africa with a majority of
enforcement actions focusing in whole or in part on conduct occurring in China.
2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse enforcement activity
often tied to expansive and evolving enforcement theories, but also FCPA policy
developments. For instance, both the Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission renewed their long-standing FCPA enforcement
commitment and the DOJ released a one year FCPA Pilot Program designed in
large part to further motivate business organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA
issues to better facilitate enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
In short, much happened in the FCPA space in 2016 and this article provides
a detailed analysis of the most notable FCPA enforcement and policy developments
and will be value to anyone seeking to elevate their FCPA knowledge.
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The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year
MIKE KOEHLER *
INTRODUCTION
On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act enforcement. This article, part of an annual series,
highlights how 2016 witnessed the largest number of corporate enforcement
actions and largest aggregate corporate settlement amounts in the FCPA’s
nearly forty-year history.
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum
of enforcement actions. For instance, there were FCPA enforcement actions
against U.S. companies as well as foreign companies; enforcement actions
that alleged egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest
levels of a company, as well as enforcement actions finding bribery based
on allegations of “golf in the morning and beer-drinking in the evening,” and
internship and hiring practices; enforcement actions against large
multinational companies, as well as small publicly traded companies,
privately held companies, and limited liability companies; enforcement
actions across a wide spectrum of industries such as technology, oil and gas,
pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial services; and
*
Mike Koehler is an Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Professor
Koehler is the founder and editor of the award-winning website FCPA Professor
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) and author of the book “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New
Era” (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014). Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are informed by
a decade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered in this article,
current as of January 1, 2017, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the
FCPA, as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA, and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve
FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can learn more about these topics and others by reading the author’s
FCPA
Professor
website;
specifically,
the
FCPA
101
page
of
the
site
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).
This article is part of a continuing series of yearly analysis by the author of FCPA enforcement and
related issues. For 2015, see Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Statistics, Theories, Policies,
and Beyond, __ CLEV. ST. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017). For 2014, see Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584661. For 2013, see Mike Koehler, A Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 961 (2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428555. For 2012, see Mike Koehler, An
Examination of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 317 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2298644. For 2011, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1 (2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191149. For 2010, see Mike Koehler, Big, Bold,
and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971021. For 2009, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599725.
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enforcement actions involving conduct across the globe from Latin America
to South America, to Eastern Europe to Africa, with a majority of
enforcement actions focusing in whole or in part on conduct occurring in
China.
The year 2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse
enforcement activity often tied to expansive and evolving enforcement
theories, but also FCPA policy developments. For instance, both the
Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission renewed
their long-standing FCPA enforcement commitment, and the DOJ released
a one-year FCPA Pilot Program designed in large part to further motivate
business organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues to better
facilitate enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
In short, much happened in the FCPA space in 2016 and this article
provides a detailed analysis of the most notable FCPA enforcement and
policy developments and will be value to anyone seeking to elevate their
FCPA knowledge.
I.

2016 FCPA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL
COMPARISONS

On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for FCPA
enforcement. While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed
overview of each enforcement action, this section highlights certain
quantitative and qualitative statistics from 2016, as well as historical
comparisons, in the following ways: corporate DOJ enforcement actions;
corporate SEC enforcement actions; aggregate corporate enforcement
actions; and individual DOJ and SEC enforcement actions. In doing so, the
following salient points will be highlighted: (i) the continued prominence of
NPAs and DPAs1 and other alternative resolution vehicles to resolve
corporate FCPA enforcement actions; and (ii) the continued gap between
corporate enforcement actions and related individual prosecutions of
company employees.

1

DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution agreement.
To learn more about DPAs and NPAs in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA
J.
INT’L
L.
907
(2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/
Enforcement,
41
GEO.
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517. Declinations with disgorgement are discussed in more detail in
Section II of this article. See infra, Section II.
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A. Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions
As demonstrated in Table I, in thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement
actions2 in 2016, the DOJ collected approximately $1.2 billion in net
settlement amounts.
Table I - 2016 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company
(Industry)

Settle-ment
Amount3

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin4

PTC6
(Technology)
Unitel (VimpelCom)7
(Telecommunication)
Olympus Latin

$14.5
million
$230.1
million8
$22.8

NPA
Plea / DPA9

Voluntary
Disclosure
Unclear

DPA

Unclear

Related
Indiv-idual
Action5
No
No
No

2
Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core approach
focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue involved a
DOJ or SEC enforcement action, or both (as is frequently the case); regardless of whether the corporate
enforcement action involved a parent company, a subsidiary, or both (as is frequently the case); and
regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC brought any related individual enforcement action (as is
occasionally the case). For additional information on this method of quantifying FCPA enforcement, see
What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action. This method of computing FCPA
statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief). Further, it is a
commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason
Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/secpractice-in-targeting-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/ (discussing how the SEC names and
penalizes defendants believed to have engaged in misconduct).
3
Historically, the settlement amount in a DOJ FCPA enforcement action was always a criminal
fine amount. However, in the HMT and NCH matters (announced on the same day), the DOJ invented a
new way to bring an FCPA enforcement action, a so-called “declination with disgorgement” pursuant to
which the company agreed to pay a disgorgement amount. This new form of resolving corporate FCPA
enforcement actions is discussed in more detail in Section II of this article. Infra, Section II.
4
Refers to the event or events that initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA
enforcement action. See Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22.3 MICH. ST. INT’L
L. REV. 961, 965, 973 (including further information about events initially prompting the scrutiny).
5
Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement action. Id. at 965,
970–71 n.29, 988.
6
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice including a Non-Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 16,
2016), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PTC-NPA.pdf.
7
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, VimpelCom Limited and Unitel LLC
Enter into Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of more than $795 Million (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vimpelcom-limited-and-unitel-llc-enter-global-foreign-briberyresolution-more-795-million.
8
Id. (value is for numerical calculation after accounting for various credits and deductions).
9
Id. The enforcement action involved criminal information against Unitel LLC resolved via a plea
agreement, and criminal information against VimpelCom resolved via a DPA. Id.
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America
(Medical Device)
BK Medical
(Analogic)11
(Medical Device)
LAN / LATAM
Airlines12
(Airline)
Och-Ziff13
(Financial Services)

million

HMT LLC16
(Oil and Gas)
NCH17
(Maintenance)
Embraer18
(Airline)

[Vol. 50:1

$3.4
million

NPA

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

$12.75
million

DPA

Foreign
Media
Reports

No

$213
million

Plea /DPA14

DOJ/SEC
Information
Requests15

No

$335,000

Declination with
Disgorgement

No

$2.7
million
$107.3
million

Declination with
Disgorgement

Voluntary
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure
DOJ/SEC
Information

No

DPA

No

10
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Equipment Company will
Pay $646 Million for Making Illegal Payments to Doctors and Hospitals in United States and Latin
America (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/medical-equipment-company-will-pay-646million-making-illegal-payments-doctors-and-hospitals.
11
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Analogic Subsidiary Agrees to Pay
More than $14 Million to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Jun. 21, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/analogic-subsidiary-agrees-pay-more-14-million-resolve-foreignbribery-charges.
12
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, LATAM Airlines Group Resolves
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $12.75 Million Criminal Penalty (Jul. 25
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/latam-airlines-group-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-actinvestigation-and-agrees-pay-1275.
13
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Och-Ziff Capital Management
Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 29,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-briberyconspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213.
14
Id. (the enforcement action involved a criminal information against OZ Africa Management GP
LLC resolved via a plea agreement, and a criminal information against Och-Ziff Capital Management
resolved via a DPA).
15
See Shareholders Foundation Inc., Update in Lawsuit for Investors in Och Ziff Capital
Management Group LLC (NYSE:OZM) Shares Announced by Shareholders Foundation, NASDAQ
GLOBENEWSWIRE
(May
10,
2016,
9:45
PM),
https://globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2016/05/10/838385/0/en/Update-in-Lawsuit-for-Investors-in-Och-Ziff-Capital-ManagementGroup-LLC-NYSE-OZM-shares-announced-by-Shareholders-Foundation.html (explaining that the
company previously disclosed, “[b]eginning in 2011, and from time to time thereafter, we have received
subpoenas from the SEC and requests for information from the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”)
in connection with an investigation involving the FCPA and related laws”).
16
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, closing the investigation of NCH
Corporation (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899121/download.
17
See id. (further explaining NCH).
18
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Embraer Agrees to Pay More Than
$107 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/embraer-agrees-pay-more-107-million-resolve-foreign-corruptpractices-act-charges.
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Requests19

JPMorgan Securities
(Asia Pacific)
(JPMorgan)20
(Financial Services)
Odebrecht / Braskem22
(Construction /
Petrochemical)
Teva Pharmaceutical24
(Pharmaceutical)

$72
million

NPA

SEC
Information
Request21

No

$252
million23

Plea / Plea

Foreign Law
Enforcement
Investigation

No

$283
million

Plea / DPA

SEC
Information
Request
/
Voluntary
Disclosure

No

General Cable25
(Wire & Cable)
TOTAL

$20.5
million
$1.2
billion

NPA

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

19

In previous SEC filings, Embraer stated: “In September, 2010, we received a subpoena from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and associated inquiries from the U.S. Department of
Justice, or DOJ, concerning possible non-compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or
FCPA, in relation to certain aircraft sales outside of Brazil.” Embraer S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F)
12 (Mar. 29, 2016); Embraer S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 12 (Mar. 27, 2015).
20
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, JPMorgan’s Investment Bank in
Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 Million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring Scheme in China (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-s-investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-millionpenalty-corrupt-hiring-scheme.
21
See JPMorgan Hiring in China Under U.S. Scrutiny - Report, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2013, 10:56
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/jpmorgan-investigation-china-idUSL2N0GJ01F20130818 (stating
that the company in an SEC filing had stated that it received “a request from the SEC Division of
Enforcement seeking information and documents relating to, among other matters, the firm’s
employment of certain former employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain
clients”).
22
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty
and Agree to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billionglobal-penalties-resolve.
23
Braskem agreed to pay the United States $94.8 million in criminal penalties and $65 million in
disgorgement. See id. (“Braskem agreed to pay a total criminal penalty of $632 million . . . [of which]
[t]he United States will receive $94.8 million . . . .”); Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to Pay $957 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-271.html (“Braskem agreed to pay $325 million in
disgorgement, including $65 million to the SEC . . . .”). Odebrecht agreed to a (reduced) penalty of $93
million. Sentencing Memorandum at 4, United States v. Odebrecht S.A., No. 16-643 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 11, 2017).
24
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
Agrees to Pay More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283million-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
25
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, General Cable Corporation Agrees
to Pay $20 Million Penalty for Foreign Bribery Schemes in Asia and Africa (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/general-cable-corporation-agrees-pay-20-million-penalty-foreignbribery-schemes-asia-and.
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As highlighted in Tables II and III below, in 2016 DOJ corporate FCPA
enforcement—measured both in terms of the number of core actions and
aggregate settlement amounts—was significantly higher than historical
averages, indeed record-setting in terms of the largest yearly DOJ settlement
amounts.
Table II - Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2016)
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

Core Actions
13
2
7
7
9
11
17

Table III – Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement
Amounts (2010 – 2016)
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

Settlement Amounts
$1.2 billion
$24.2 million
$1.25 billion
$420 million
$142 million
$355 million
$870 million

Even though DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2016 was record-setting, few
meaningful big-picture conclusions should be drawn.
For starters, year-to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary
cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value given that many nonsubstantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate FCPA
enforcement action.26 Moreover, and as highlighted in more detail in Table
26

Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component are typically
announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it is
common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish its
investigation of the conduct at issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company. Although far
from an exclusive list, additional non-substantive factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA
enforcement action include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves), as
well as securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action.
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VII below, FCPA enforcement statistics in most years are impacted by a few
unique events and often one or a small group of enforcement actions
significantly skew enforcement statistics.27
Nevertheless, two DOJ FCPA enforcement statistics from 2016 are
worthy of further exploration: (i) the continued prominence of NPAs and
DPAs and other alternative resolution vehicles to resolve corporate FCPA
enforcement actions; and (ii) the continued lack of related individual DOJ
prosecutions in connection with corporate enforcement actions.
The first notable statistic is that twelve of the thirteen (92%) corporate
enforcement actions (all but Odebrecht / Braskem) were resolved either
through an NPA, DPA, or a so-called declination with disgorgement—a new
method the DOJ invented in 2016 to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement
actions.28 This is consistent with the trend in the FCPA’s modern era of the
DOJ resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions through such
controversial resolution vehicles.29 Indeed, since 2010 approximately 85%
of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have involved alternative resolution
vehicles.30
The second notable statistic is that none of the 2016 corporate
enforcement actions have (at least yet) resulted in any related DOJ charges
against company employees. This statistic, while troubling, is not a
significant anomaly given that approximately 80% of DOJ corporate
enforcement actions since 2006 have not resulted in any related DOJ charges
against company employees.31 However, this statistic was more notable in
2016 compared to prior years given the DOJ’s release in late 2015 of a policy
memo titled “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.” In the
so-called Yates Memo, the DOJ stated:
One of the most effective ways to combat corporate
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals
who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such accountability is
27

Id. For instance, in 2017 there is likely to be an approximately $900 million enforcement action
that alone will eclipse total FCPA settlement amounts in several prior years. See The Burgeoning
Uzbekistan
Telecommunication
Investigations,
FCPA
Professor
(Nov.
9,
2015),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-burgeoning-uzbekistan-telecommunication-investigations.
28
See Mike Koehler, DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA – 2016 Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-fcpa-2016-year-review/ (containing links to
statistics for prior years).
29
To learn more about NPAs and DPAs, including why such alternative resolution vehicles are
controversial, see Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 910–924
(2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517; Mike Koehler, Measuring the
Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 499, 528–29 (2015); Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt
ST.
INT’L
L.
REV. 961,
978–
Practices
Act
Narrative,
22
MICH.
87 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428555.
30
To determine each action’s resolution vehicle, see SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, infra note 75, and view the “related documents” under each case.
31
Id.
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important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity,
it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that
the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and it
promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system.32
In subsequent public comments, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
stated, that towards the above objectives, “[t]he revised factors [in the Yates
Memo] now emphasize the primacy in any corporate case of holding
individual wrongdoers accountable and list a variety of steps that
prosecutors are expected to take to maximize the opportunity to achieve that
goal.”33 Specifically in the FCPA context, Yates stated:
[W]e cannot forget that behind every bribe and illegal payment
is one or more individuals who knew what they were doing
was wrong and nonetheless broke the law. . . . [W]e must do
our best to ensure that whoever is responsible is held
accountable. . . . [T]he best way to deter individual conduct is
the threat of going to jail. That’s what truly changes behavior.
That’s what changes the calculus as employees and executives
decide whether to participate in an illegal scheme.34
Additionally, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell stated that
“certainly . . . there has been an increased emphasis on, let’s get some
individuals” and that it is “very important for [the DOJ] to hold accountable
individuals who engage in criminal misconduct in white-collar (cases), as
we do in every other kind of crime,” and DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Patrick
Stokes stated that the DOJ is “very focused” on prosecuting individuals as
well as companies and that “going after one or the other is not sufficient for
deterrence purposes.”35
Yet, similar to prior years, actual statistics prove how hollow the DOJ’s
rhetoric is when it comes to holding individuals accountable for conduct
giving rise to corporate FCPA enforcement actions.

32

Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General on
Individual
Accountability
for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.
33
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney General Sally
Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at American Banking Association and American Bar Association
Money
Laundering
Enforcement
Convergence
(Nov.
16,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarksamerican-banking-0.
34
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q.
Yates Delivers Remarks at the 33rd Annual International Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-deliversremarks-33rd-annual-international.
35
Mike Koehler, A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2017)
http://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-doj-individual-actions/.
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B. Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions
As demonstrated in Table IV, in twenty-four corporate FCPA
enforcement actions in 2016 the SEC collected approximately $1.07 billion
in settlement amounts.

102

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

Table IV - 2016 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company
(Industry)

Settlement
Amount

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin

Related
Individual
Action
Yes

SAP36
(Technology)
SciClone
Pharmaceuticals38
(Pharmaceutical)
PTC39
(Technology)
VimeplCom40
(Telecommunications)

$3.9
million
$12.8
million

Admin.
Action
Admin.
Action

SEC
Investigation37
SEC
Investigation

$13.7
million
$167.5
million41

Voluntary
Disclosure
Unclear

Yes

Qualcomm42
(Technology)
Nordion44

$7.5
million
$375,000

Admin.
Action
Settled
Civil
Complaint
Admin.
Action
Admin.

DOJ/SEC
Investigation43
Voluntary

No

No

No

Yes

36
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Software Company With FCPA
Violations (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-17.html.
37
See id. (“An SEC investigation found that SAP’s deficient internal controls allowed a former
SAP executive to pay $145,000 in bribes to a senior Panamanian government official and offer bribes to
two others in exchange for lucrative sales contracts.”).
38
For more information on SciClone Pharmaceuticals, see United States of America Before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Order Instituting Cease-andDesist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings,
and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/3477058.pdf.
39
For more information on PTC, see United States of America Before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, PTC INC., Order Instituting Cease-And Desist Proceedings Pursuant To Section 21C of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77145.pdf.
40
Id. For more information on VimpelCom, see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
VimpelCom to Pay $795 Million in Global Settlement for FCPA Violations (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-34.html.
41
After accounting for various credit and deductions.
42
Qualcomm Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 No. 3-17145 (Mar. 1, 2016) (Administrative
Proceeding).
43
Qualcomm’s FCPA scrutiny was, at least partially, related to a September 2010 formal order of
private investigation from the SEC that arose from a “whistleblower’s” allegations made in December
2009 to the audit committee of the Company’s Board of Directors and to the SEC. As Qualcomm
previously disclosed, “the audit committee completed an internal review of the allegations with the
assistance of independent counsel and independent forensic accountants. This internal review into the
whistleblower’s allegations and related accounting practices did not identify any errors in the Company’s
financial statements.” Qualcomm Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 25, 2011). More directly
related to the FCPA scrutiny, according to Qualcomm’s previous disclosure: “On January 27, 2012, the
Company learned that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California/DOJ has begun
a preliminary investigation regarding the Company’s compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), a topic about which the SEC is also inquiring.” Id.
44
Press Release, SEC Charges Engineer and Former Employer with Bribe Scheme in Russia, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77288-s.pdf.
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$322,000

Action
Admin.
Action
Admin.
Action
NPA

$672,000

NPA

$11.5
million
$9.4
million
$14.4
million
$5 million

Admin.
Action
Admin.
Action
Admin.
Action
Admin.
Action

$5.5
million

Admin.
Action

$25
million
$9 million

Disclosure
SEC
Investigation46
SEC
Investigation48
Voluntary
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure
Voluntary
Disclosure
Foreign Media
Reports
Voluntary
Disclosure
SEC
Information
Request55
Industry
Sweep57
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No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Novartis AG, Exchange Act Release No. 77,431 at 8–9, 113 SEC Docket 15 (Mar. 23, 2016).
The SEC’s order states: “In connection with the SEC Staff s investigation and in response to
media reports concerning a competitor in August 2013, Novartis instituted an expansive review of its
relationships in China with travel and event planning vendors.” Id. at 5.
47
Las Vegas Sands Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 77,555 at 10, 113 SEC Docket 17 (Apr. 7,
2016).
48
The SEC’s order states: “In connection with the investigation by the Staff, the LVSC Audit
Committee retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation.” Id. at 9.
49
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution Agreements
in FCPA Cases (June 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html.
50
Id.
51
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Medical Device Manufacturer with
FCPA Violations (June 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-126.html.
52
LAN Airlines S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 78,402 at 10, 114 SEC Docket 13 (July 25, 2016).
53
Johnson Controls, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,287 at 7, 114 SEC Docket 11 (July 11,
2016).
54
Key Energy Servs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,558 at 8, 114 SEC Docket 15 (Aug. 11,
2016).
55
The SEC’s order states: “In or around January 2014, the staff of the Commission contacted Key
Energy with respect to potential FCPA violations by Key Energy. In April 2014, Key Mexico employees
reported to Key Energy information they had received suggesting the recently resigned country manager
had promised bribes to one or more Pemex employees during his employment with Key Mexico. Upon
learning of these allegations, Key Energy reported the allegations to the staff of the Commission.” Id. at
6.
56
AstraZeneca PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,730 at 6, 114 SEC Docket 18 (Aug. 30, 2016).
57
In an August 2010 filing, the company disclosed: “AstraZeneca PLC has received inquiries from
the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with an
investigation into Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry. AstraZeneca is
cooperating with their inquiries.” AstraZeneca PLC, Annual Report (Form 6-K) (Aug. 9, 2010).
46
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Nu Skin
(Healthcare
Products)
AB InBev59
(Beverage)

$765,000

Admin.
Action

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

$6 million

Admin.
Action

No

Och-Ziff61
(Financial Services)

$199
million

Admin.
Action

GlaxoSmithKline63
(Pharmaceutical)
Embraer65
(Airline)

$20
million
$79.4
million66

JPMorgan68

$130.6

Admin.
Action
Settled
Civil
Complaint
Admin.

SEC
Information
Request60
DOJ/SEC
Information
Requests62
Industry
Sweep64
DOJ/SEC
Information
Requests67
SEC

58

Yes
No
No
No

Nu Skin Enters., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,884 at 5, 115 SEC Docket 1 (Sept. 20, 2016).
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78,957 at 9, 115 SEC Docket 2 (Sept.
28, 2016).
60
The SEC’s order states: “AB InBev did not report the 2009 and 2011 complaints to the
Commission staff before the Commission first contacted AB InBev in October 2011.” Id. at 7.
61
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund Settles FCPA Charges (Sept.
29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-203.html.
62
The company previously disclosed: “Beginning in 2011, and from time to time thereafter, we
have received subpoenas from the SEC and requests for information from the U.S. Department of Justice
(the “DOJ”) in connection with an investigation involving the FCPA and related laws.” Och-Ziff Capital
Management Group LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2013).
63
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, GlaxoSmithKline Pays $20 Million Penalty to Settle
FCPA Violations (Sep. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79005-s.pdf.
64
The company previously disclosed: “The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an industry-wide enquiry in 2010 into whether
pharmaceutical companies may have engaged in violations of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) relating to the sale of pharmaceuticals, including in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany,
Italy, Poland, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Group is one of the companies that has been asked to respond
to this enquiry and is cooperating with the SEC and DOJ. The Group has informed the DOJ and SEC
about the investigation of its China operations by the Chinese government that was initiated in 2013 and
the outcome of that investigation. The Group also has briefed the DOJ and SEC regarding other countries
and issues.” GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 18, 2016).
65
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Embraer Paying $205 Million to Settle FCPA Charges
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-224.html.
66
The SEC’s resolution documents mention $83.8 million in disgorgement and $14.4 million in
prejudgment interest. However, the SEC agreed to credit a disgorgement amount that Embraer agreed to
pay to Brazilian authorities and that disgorgement amount is approximately $18.6 million. See Embraer
S.A., Annual Report (Form 6-K) (Oct. 24, 2016) (“We agreed to pay US$98.2 million to the SEC (of
which up to US$20.0 million may be deducted if such amount is actually paid to the MPF and the CVM
under the TCAC, as described below), as disgorgement of profits.”).
67
In SEC filings, Embraer stated: “In September, 2010, we received a subpoena from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and associated inquiries from the U.S. Department of Justice, or
DOJ, concerning possible non-compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, or FCPA, in
relation to certain aircraft sales outside of Brazil.” Embraer, S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Dec. 31,
2014).
68
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle FCPA
Charges (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.html.
59
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No
No
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As highlighted in Tables V and VI below, SEC corporate FCPA
enforcement in 2016 was up compared to historical averages—indeed
record-setting in terms of both the largest number of SEC corporate
enforcement actions and the largest yearly SEC settlement amounts.
Table V – Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2016)
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

Core Actions
24
9
7
8
8
13
19

69
In an SEC filing, the company stated: “A request from the SEC Division of Enforcement seeking
information and documents relating to, among other matters, the Firm’s employment of certain former
employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain clients.” JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
Annual Report (Form 10-Q) (Jun. 30, 2013).
70
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to Pay
$957 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016271.html.
71
After accounting for various credits and deductions. See id. (noting that Braskem agreed to pay
$65 million to the SEC).
72
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Teva Pharmaceutical Paying $519 Million to Settle
FCPA Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-277.html.
73
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Wire and Cable Manufacturer Settles FCPA and
Accounting Charges (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-283.html.
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Table VI – SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010
– 2016)
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

Settlement Amounts
$1.07 billion
$114 million
$327 million
$300 million
$118 million
$148 million
$530 million

Even though SEC FCPA enforcement in 2016 was record-setting, for
the same reasons discussed above, few meaningful conclusions should be
drawn. Nevertheless, two statistics are noteworthy: (i) the continued
prominence of SEC administrative actions, as well as alternative resolution
vehicles; and (ii) the continued gap between SEC corporate enforcement
actions and related individual prosecutions.
The first noteworthy statistic is that twenty of the twenty-four (83%)
corporate enforcement actions were resolved either through an
administrative order or an NPA. As a result of these controversial resolution
vehicles, there was no judicial scrutiny of 83% of SEC FCPA enforcement
actions from 2016.74 This statistic furthers a clear trend regarding SEC
corporate FCPA enforcement. For instance, in 2015 there was no judicial
scrutiny of 89% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions, and in 2014 there was
no judicial scrutiny of 86% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions.75
The second noteworthy statistic is the continued gap between SEC
corporate enforcement actions and related individual prosecutions. Even
though SEC Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney stated in 2016, similar
to prior years, that “pursuing individual accountability [in FCPA
enforcement actions] is a critical part of deterrence . . . and the Division of
Enforcement will continue to do everything we can to hold individuals
accountable,”76 the fact remains that seventeen of the twenty-four (71%)
74
For an extended discussion of the origins and controversy of SEC administrative orders and
DPAs, see generally Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA
J. INT’L L. 143 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584661.
75
Of the nine enforcement actions in 2015, only the Hitachi settlement was subject to judicial
scrutiny. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) (follow hyperlinks
under the appropriate year’s heading to find the SEC press releases for each enforcement action).
Additionally, of the eight enforcement actions in 2014, only the Avon Products settlement was subject
to judicial scrutiny. Id.
76
Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at ACI’s
33rd International Conference on the FCPA (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speechceresney-113016.html.
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corporate enforcement actions did not result in related enforcement actions
against company employees. Again, this statistic, while troubling, is
consistent with prior years, as approximately 80% of corporate SEC FCPA
enforcement actions since 2006 have not (at least yet) resulted in any related
charges of company employees.77
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I
through VI above is informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate
law enforcement agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC
FCPA enforcement actions.78 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC
FCPA enforcement data in the aggregate is also informative because it
provides a more holistic view of FCPA enforcement.
C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
In 2016, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $2.3 billion
in twenty-seven core corporate enforcement actions—both yearly records in
terms of the number of core corporate enforcement actions, as well as
aggregate settlement amounts.
Table VII, below, aggregates DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement
statistics over time and highlights unique circumstances which may have
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year.
Table VII – Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2016)
Year
2007

Core
Actions
15

Settlement
Amount
$149
million

Of Note
Six enforcement actions involved Iraq Oil
for Food conduct and these enforcement
actions comprised 40% of all enforcement
actions and approximately 50% of the
$149 million amount.

77
Mike Koehler, A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-sec-individual-actions/.
78
As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies—domestic and foreign
—with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings with the SEC). In other
words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private companies or foreign companies that
are not issuers. Thus, certain DOJ corporate enforcement actions from 2016 did not have an SEC
component because the companies (for instance HMT and NCH) were private companies not subject to
SEC jurisdiction. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic
concerns,” (i.e., any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S.
law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct “while in the
territory of the U.S.” Compared to the SEC’s civil burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence, the
DOJ has a higher burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution. Perhaps based
on this difference, several SEC enforcement actions in 2016 (such as SAP, SciClone Pharmaceuticals,
Qualcomm, Nordion, Novartis, Key Energy, AstraZeneca, Nu Skin, AB InBev, and GlaxoSmithKline)
did not involve a related DOJ component.
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2008

10

$885
million

2009

11

$645
million

2010

21

$1.4 billion

2011

16

$503
million

2012

12

2013

9

$260
million
$720
million

2014

10

$1.6 billion

2015

11

2016

27

$139
million
$2.3 billion

TOTAL

142

$8.7 billion
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The $800 million Siemens enforcement
action comprised approximately 90% of
the $885 million amount.
The $579 million KBR / Halliburton
Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action
comprised approximately 90% of the
$645 million amount.
Six enforcement actions, all resolved on
the same day, involved various oil and gas
companies’ use of Panalpina in Nigeria.
Panalpina also resolved an enforcement
action on the same day.
Two enforcement actions (Technip and
Eni / Snamprogetti) involved Bonny
Island conduct.
In other words, there were 14 unique
corporate enforcement actions in 2010. Of
further note, the two Bonny Island
enforcement actions, Technip ($338
million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365
million) comprised approximately 50% of
the $1.4 billion amount.
The $219 million JGC Corp. enforcement
action involved Bonny Island conduct and
comprised approximately 44% of the
$503 million amount.
No enforcement actions significantly
skewed the statistics.
The $398 million Total enforcement
action comprised approximately 55% of
the $720 million amount.
Two enforcement actions (Alstom - $772
million and Alcoa - $384 million)
comprised approximately 72% of the $1.6
billion amount.
No enforcement actions significantly
skewed the statistics.
Three enforcement actions (Teva,
Odebrecht/Braskem and VimpelCom)
comprised approximately 56% of the
$2.41 billion amount and five
enforcement actions (the three mentioned
above plus JP Morgan and Embraer)
comprised approximately 72% of the
amount.
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D. Individual DOJ and SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions
The statistics highlighted above regarding the notable gap between
corporate FCPA enforcement and related individual enforcement against
company employees are not meant to suggest that the DOJ or SEC do not
bring individual FCPA enforcement actions. The next section highlights
2016 DOJ and SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions and also provides
historical comparisons.
As demonstrated in Table VIII, in 2016 the DOJ filed or announced
FCPA criminal charges against eight individuals.
Table VIII – 2016 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual

Employer / Former
Employer

Moises Abraham Millan
Escobar79

Associated with various
privately-held energy
companies
Connected to Och-Ziff

Samuel Mebiame80
Ng Lap Seng and Jeff
Yin81
Daniel Perez, Kamta
Ramnarine, Victor
Valdez, and Douglas
Ray82

Associated with an Unnamed
Non-Governmental
Organization

Associated with Hunt Pan
Am Aviation Inc.

Related Corporate
Enforcement
Action
No
Yes
No
No

As highlighted in Table IX, the number of DOJ individual FCPA
enforcement actions in 2016 was generally below historical averages.

79
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Miami Businessman Pleads Guilty
to Foreign Bribery and Fraud Charges in Connection with Venezuela Bribery Scheme (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/miami-businessman-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-and-fraud-chargesconnection-venezuela.
80
Complaint, United States v. Mebiame, 2016 WL 8411041 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:16CR00627),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/943131/download.
81
Indictment, United States v. NG Lap Seng, 2017 WL 2693625 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. S5 15 Cr.
706 (VSB)), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/913286/download.
82
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Four Businessmen and Two Foreign
Officials Plead Guilty in Connection with Bribes Paid to Mexican Aviation Officials (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-businessmen-and-two-foreign-officials-plead-guilty-connectionbribes-paid-mexican.
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Table IX - DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2016)83
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007

Individuals Charged with Criminal
FCPA Offenses
8
8
10
12
2
10
33 (including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
18
14
7

As demonstrated in Table X, in 2016 the SEC brought FCPA civil
charges against eight individuals.
Table X – 2016 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual
Ignacio Cueto Plaza84
Yu Kai Yuan85
Mikhail Gourevitch86
Lars Frost87
Jun Ping Zhang88
Daniel Och89
Joel Frank
Karl Zimmer90

Employer / Former
Employer
LAN Airlines
PTC
Nordion
BK Medical (Analogic)
CareFx China / Harris
Corp
Och-Ziff

Related Corporate
Enforcement Action
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

General Cable

Yes

Yes

83
Mike Koehler, A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2017)
https://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-doj-individual-actions/.
84
Ignacio Cueto Plaza, Respondent, Exchange Act Release No. 77057, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. AE-3738, 2016 WL 683570 (Feb. 4, 2016) (cease and desist order).
85
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC: Tech Company Bribed Chinese Officials (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-29.html.
86
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Engineer and Former Employer with
Bribe Scheme in Russia (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77288-s.pdf.
87
Analogic Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 78113, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No. AE-3784, 2016 WL 4363422 (July 21, 2016) (cease and desist order).
88
Jun Ping Zhang, Exchange Act Release No. 78825, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act
Release No, AE-3800, 2016 WL 4761087 (Sept. 13, 2016) (cease and desist order).
89
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78989, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. IA-4540, 2016 WL 5461964 (Sept. 29, 2016) (cease and desist order).
90
Karl J. Zimmer, Exchange Act Release No. 79704, 2016 WL 7474486 (Dec. 29, 2016) (cease
and desist order).
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As highlighted in Table XI, the number of SEC individual FCPA
enforcement actions in 2016 was generally higher than historical averages—
likely the result of the record number of corporate FCPA enforcement
actions brought by the SEC in 2016.
Table XI - SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2015)91
Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007

Individuals Charged with Civil
FCPA Offenses
8
2
2
0
4
12
7
5
5
7

II. NOTEWORTHY ISSUES FROM 2016
Compared to the quantitative statistics set forth above, this section
highlights various qualitative issues from 2016 FCPA enforcement,
including several FCPA enforcement action firsts, expansive and evolving
enforcement theories, and FCPA policy developments.
A. FCPA Enforcement Action Firsts and Other Qualitative Highlights
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum
of enforcement actions. For instance, as highlighted in Table XII below,
there were FCPA enforcement actions against U.S. companies as well as
foreign companies subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction; enforcement actions
that alleged egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest
levels of a company (such as VimpelCom and Odebrecht/Braskem) as well
as enforcement actions based on allegations of “golf in the morning and
beer-drinking in the evening” (SciClone Pharmaceuticals) and internship
and hiring practices such as JPMorgan as discussed in more detail below;
enforcement actions against large multinational companies (such as SAP and
Qualcomm) as well as small publicly-traded companies (such as Nortek,
Akamai Technologies and General Cable) and privately-held, limited
liability companies such as HMT; enforcement actions against business
91
Mike Koehler, A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA Professor (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-sec-individual-actions/.
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organizations across a wide spectrum of industries such as technology, oil
and gas, pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial services;
and enforcement actions, depicted in the below map, involving conduct
across the globe from Latin America to South America, to Eastern Europe
to Africa, with a majority of enforcement actions focusing in whole or in
part on conduct occurring in China.

In 2016, FCPA enforcement also witnessed several FCPA enforcement
action firsts and other qualitative highlights.
In terms of firsts, foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S.
exchange are subject to the FCPA. Given that companies headquartered in
Canada and Israel comprise approximately 40% of foreign companies with
shares listed on a U.S. exchange,92 it was only a matter of time before a
Canadian and Israeli company resolved an FCPA enforcement action.
In 2016, Nordion (Canada) Inc. became the first Canadian company to
resolve an FCPA enforcement action as the SEC found in an administrative
order that it violated the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls
provisions “in connection with payments made to a third party agent to

92

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NUMBER OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES REGISTERED AND REPORTING
THE
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(2013),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary2013.pdf.
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obtain Russian government approval to distribute TheraSphere, Nordion’s
liver cancer treatment, in Russia.”93 According to the SEC,
Nordion failed to record those payments in a manner that
accurately and fairly reflected the transactions in its books and
records [and] also failed to devise and maintain adequate
internal accounting controls to provide sufficient reassurances
that Nordion funds were used as authorized, that third-party
agents were appropriately vetted, and that Nordion adequately
trained its employees to conduct business in countries with
significant corruption risks.94
While the $375,000 settlement amount was not notable, the fact that it was
the first FCPA enforcement action against a Canadian company was notable.
Also in 2016, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. became the first
Israeli company to resolve an FCPA enforcement action. In pertinent part,
the parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement action focused on Copaxone, a drug
used in the treatment of multiple sclerosis and Teva’s most profitable
product during the relevant time period.95 Although there was no allegation
or finding that Copaxone was an inferior product or that it compromised
patient health, the enforcement action alleged that Teva Russia and Teva
Mexico engaged in various schemes to provide things of value to alleged
foreign officials to influence product purchase. In addition, the enforcement
action alleged that Teva Ukraine provided various things of value to a
Ukrainian official to induce him to use his official position within the
Ukrainian government to improperly influence the registration of Teva
pharmaceutical products in Ukraine. The bulk of the alleged improper
conduct focused on Russia, and specifically Teva Russia’s relationship with
a Russian company owned, controlled, and managed by a Russian official
with influence over the purchase of pharmaceutical products by the Russian
government. In this regard, the DOJ specifically alleged that “employees and
agents of Teva Russia concealed negative information about Russian
Company when Teva was undertaking due diligence, including information
about Russian Official’s alleged involvement in corruption related to
Russian government drug procurement auctions.”96 The $519-million
overall settlement amount in the Teva enforcement action was by far the

93
Nordion (Canada) Inc., Respondent, Exchange Act Release No. 77290, 2016 WL 825662 (Mar.
3, 2016) (cease and desist order).
94
Id.
95
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
Ltd. Agrees to Pay More than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec.
22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283million-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
96
Information at 15, United States v. Teva LLC, Case No. 1:16-cr-20967-KMW (S.D. Fla. Dec.
22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/920236/download.
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largest ever FCPA enforcement action against a pharmaceutical company97
and the fourth-largest FCPA settlement amount of all time.98
In terms of other FCPA enforcement firsts, the SEC’s 2016 FCPA
enforcement action against Och-Ziff Capital Management Group executives
Daniel Och and Joel Frank stands out. In connection with a $412-million
parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement action against the hedge fund for alleged
improper practices in various African countries,99 the SEC also found in an
administrative order that Och (CEO and Chairman of the company) was a
cause of certain of the company’s FCPA books and records violations, and
that Frank (CFO of the company) was a cause of certain of the company’s
FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.100 The SEC
findings as to Och and Frank are believed to be the first time in FCPA history
that the SEC found the current CEO and CFO of an issuer company liable
for company FCPA violations.101 “Without admitting or denying the SEC’s
findings, Och agreed to pay approximately $2.2 million ($1,900,000—
reflecting his estimated share of gain to Och-Ziff resulting from the
transactions with a Democratic Republic of Congo Partner and $273,718 in
prejudgment interest),” the largest settlement amount in FCPA history by an
individual in an SEC enforcement action.102

97
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
Agrees to Pay More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million
-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
98
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm (providing
that Siemens paid $450 million to DOJ and $350 million to SEC); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Office of Pub. Affairs, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve
Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-andagrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery (providing that Alstom paid $772
million to DOJ); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for
FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm (providing that
KBR and Halliburton paid $402 million to DOJ and $177 million to SEC); Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Teva Pharmaceuticals Paying $519 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-277.html (providing that Teva Pharmaceuticals paid $283
million to DOJ and $236 million to SEC).
99
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Och-Ziff Capital Management
Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine, (Sept. 29,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-briberyconspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213 (releasing information about Och-Ziff’s three-year deferred
prosecution agreement); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund Settles
FCPA Charges (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-203.html (announcing
Och-Ziff’s agreement to pay “nearly $200 million to the SEC to settle civil charges of violating the
[FCPA]”).
100
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, supra note 90.
101
See Ceresney, supra note 77 (emphasizing that Och-Ziff African Bribery case was the first FCPA
action against a hedge fund and one that emphasized individual liability of the senior executives).
102
Id.
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Similar to the SEC’s charges against Och and Frank, in 2016 the SEC
also brought an FCPA enforcement action against Ignacio Cueto Plaza, the
current CEO of LAN Airlines.103 In pertinent part, the SEC found:
In 2006 and 2007, Ignacio Cueto Plaza (“Cueto”), the CEO of
LAN Airlines S.A. (“LAN”), authorized $1.15 million in
improper payments to a third party consultant in Argentina in
connection with LAN’s attempts to settle disputes on wages
and other work conditions between LAN Argentina S.A.
(“LAN Argentina”), a subsidiary of LAN, and its employees.
At the time, Cueto understood that it was possible the
consultant would pass some portion of the $1.15 million to
union officials in Argentina. The payments were made
pursuant to an unsigned consulting agreement that purported
to provide services that Cueto understood would not occur.
Cueto authorized subordinates to make the payments that were
improperly booked in the Company’s books and records,
which circumvented LAN’s internal accounting controls.104
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Cueto agreed to cease
and desist from future legal violations and to pay a $75,000 civil penalty.105
A few months later, and based on the same core conduct, the DOJ and SEC
also brought a parallel $22-million FCPA enforcement action against LAN
Airlines.106 The enforcement action was notable because in the resolution
documents the DOJ criticized the company for allowing Cueto to remain in
his position. Specifically, the DOJ stated: “[T]he Company has failed to
remediate adequately, including significantly by failing to discipline in any
way the employees responsible for the criminal conduct recounted in the
statement of facts . . . including misconduct by at least one high-level
Company executive, and thus the ability of the compliance program to be
effective in practice is compromised.”107 The LAN enforcement action was
also notable in that it was believed to be the first FCPA enforcement in
history against a company headquartered in South America.108 This unique

103

Ignacio Queto Plaza, supra note 85.
Id. at 2.
105
Id. at 9.
106
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, LATAM Airlines Group Resolves
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $12.75 Million Criminal Penalty (July
25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/latam-airlines-group-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-actinvestigation-and-agrees-pay-1275; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, LAN Airlines Settles
FCPA Charges (July 25, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-151.html.
107
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Latam Airlines Group S.A., Case No. 1660195-DTKH (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/879136/download.
108
Mike Koehler, Issues to Consider from the LAN Airlines Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR
(July 27, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-lan-airlines-enforcement-action/.
104
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list soon expanded as 2016 also witnessed FCPA enforcement actions
against Brazil-based companies Embraer and Odebrecht/Braskem.
The Cueto / LAN Airlines enforcement action based on allegations that
a Chilean company engaged in improper conduct in Argentina, as well as
the other 2016 FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies
highlighted in Table XII below, raise important questions about the proper
scope of FCPA enforcement and related policy issues.
Table XII – 2016 FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Non-U.S.
Companies
Company
(Headquarters)
SAP
(Germany)

VimpelCom
(The Netherlands)

LAN Airlines
(Chile)

Nordion
(Canada)

Novartis
(Switzerland)

AstraZeneca
(United Kingdom)

General Allegations

Jurisdictional Basis

Improper payments to
official(s) in Panama and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in Uzbekistan
and associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments in
Argentina and associated
books and records and
internal controls
deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in Russia and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in China and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in China and
Russia, and associated
books and records and
internal controls
deficiencies

Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
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ABInBev
(Belgium)

GlaxoSmithKline
(United Kingdom)

Embraer
(Brazil)

Odebrecht /
Braskem
(Brazil)

Teva Pharma
(Israel)
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Improper payments to
official(s) in India and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in China and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in Dominican
Republic, Saudi Arabia,
Mozambique, and India;
and associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in Brazil,
Angola, Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia,
Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Mozambique,
Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela; and
associated books and
records and internal
controls deficiencies
Improper payments to
official(s) in Russia,
Ukraine, and Mexico
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Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange; Embraer’s
wholly-owned U.S.
subsidiary was active in the
bribery schemes, including
by making payments from its
New York-based bank
account.
Odebrecht: Money
connected to the bribery
scheme flowed through New
York-based bank accounts
Braskem: Securities
registered with the SEC and
listed on a U.S. exchange;
money connected to the
bribery scheme flowed
through New York-based
bank accounts
Securities registered with the
SEC and listed on a U.S.
exchange; e-mails in
connection with the bribery
schemes passed through U.S.
servers; payments in
connection with the bribery
schemes were wired through
U.S. correspondent banks.

While many of the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign
companies were technically resolved through “only” FCPA books and
records and internal controls charges or findings (provisions which have no
specific jurisdictional elements other than a U.S. securities listing), the
policy issue remains: what legitimate U.S. law enforcement interests are
implicated when, for example, a German company interacts with
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Panamanian officials, a Canadian company interacts with Russian officials,
or a United Kingdom or Swiss company interacts with Chinese officials?
Even those FCPA enforcement actions highlighted above that did charge
or find violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions (which do have a
specific U.S. nexus requirement for foreign companies), do random
payments or e-mails passing through the U.S. implicate legitimate U.S. law
enforcement interests when, for instance, a Brazilian company interacts with
officials in the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, and India,
or an Israeli company interacts with officials in Russia, Ukraine, and
Mexico?
The FCPA enforcement action against Brazilian companies
Odebrecht/Braskem presented unique policy issues never before seen in
FCPA enforcement prior to 2016. What made the enforcement action unique
is that it was believed to be the first FCPA enforcement action in history
against a foreign issuer for allegedly bribing its own domestic officials. In
other words, a large portion of the U.S. enforcement action against the
Brazilian companies was that they made improper payments to Brazilian
officials.
The closest FCPA enforcement came to this unique dynamic was in a
1996 SEC FCPA enforcement action against Italy-based Montedison (the
first SEC FCPA enforcement action against a foreign issuer).109 Despite
SEC allegations that the company made improper payments to Italian
officials, the SEC (while charging the company with books and records and
internal controls violations) did not charge the company with violating the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.110 According to a knowledgeable source at
the SEC at the time, there was a belief that there were no “foreign” officials
involved because Montedison, an Italian company, allegedly made
improper payments to Italian officials.111
The flip side of the U.S. enforcement action against Odebrecht/Braskem
would be Brazilian law enforcement bringing a multi-million-dollar
enforcement action against a U.S. company for making allegedly improper
payments to U.S. officials because the U.S. company has securities listed on
a Brazilian exchange and/or a portion of the bribe payments may have
flowed through a Brazil-based account.
Is the U.S. prepared for this to happen? Long before the unique 2016
FCPA enforcement against Odebrecht/Braskem, Senator Christopher Coons
(D-DE) stated during a 2010 Senate FCPA hearing: “Today we are the only
nation that is extending extraterritorial reach and going after the citizens of
109
Exchange Act Release No. 15164, Civil Action No. 1:96CV02631 (HHG) (D.D.C. Nov. 21,
1996), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr15164.txt.
110
See id. (announcing charges of financial fraud and violations of the “corporate reporting, books
and records, and internal control provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”).
111
See id. (“[T]he scheme was designed to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars of payments
that, among other things, were used to bribe politicians in Italy and other persons.”).
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other countries, we may someday find ourselves on the receiving end of such
transnational actions.”112 Regardless of the answer to the above question, in
the minds of some, FCPA enforcement has become a convenient cash cow
for the U.S. government.113 The above enforcement actions in 2016 against
foreign companies, which resulted in approximately $1.5 billion flowing
into the U.S. treasury, only amplify these concerns.
Moreover, all of the 2016 FCPA enforcement actions against foreign
companies were against companies headquartered in countries that, like the
U.S., are parties to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention).114 In other words, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Canada, Brazil, Israel, Belgium, and Chile are all “peer” countries with
mature FCPA-like laws governing the conduct of their companies coupled
with a reputable legal system to prosecute such offenses. Given this reality,
as well as the specific provision in Article 4 of the OECD Convention that
“when more than one Party has jurisdiction over an alleged offence
described in this Convention, the Parties involved shall, at the request of one
of them, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction
for prosecution,” can it truly be said that the U.S. is the most appropriate
jurisdiction to prosecute certain foreign companies for alleged interactions
with non-U.S. officials?
In this regard, it is worth highlighting that part of the FCPA reform
discussion in the 1980s were bills seeking to waive the FCPA’s provisions
“in the case of any country which the Attorney General has certified to have
(1) effective bribery or corruption statutes; and (2) an established record of
aggressive enforcement of such statutes.”115
B. Expansive and Evolving FCPA Enforcement Theories
Substantively, the FCPA’s core anti-bribery provisions have not
changed since the 1998 amendments to the statute. However, with each
passing year the range of conduct the enforcement agencies view to be in
violation of the FCPA seems to expand. There are several practical and
112
Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 (2010) (statement
of Sen. Coons).
113
See Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2009, 1:06
PM), https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-opinions-contributors-michaelperlis-wrenn-chais.html (“While these causes have increased investigations, governments will keep
pursuing corrupt business practices for one very simple reason—it’s lucrative.”).
114
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.html.
115
See S. 1797, 99th Cong. (1985) (Competitive America Trade Reform Act of 1985, introduced
on October 29, 1985, by Senator Gary Hart (D-CO)); H.R. 3813, 99th Cong. (1985) (Competitive
America Trade Reform Act of 1985, introduced on November 21, 1985 by Representative Vic Fazio (DCA)).
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provocative reasons for the general increase in FCPA enforcement since
2004116 and expansive and evolving enforcement theories are certainly at
the top of the list. What makes this dynamic problematic from a policy
perspective is that the expansion has generally occurred in the absence of
any meaningful judicial scrutiny. In this regard, 2016 witnessed the
continued expansion and evolution of two prominent enforcement theories:
(i) healthcare workers as “foreign officials,” and (ii) internship and hiring
practices being a form of bribery.
1. Healthcare Workers As “Foreign Officials”
The legislative history is clear that the recipient category Congress had
in mind when enacting the FCPA was bona fide foreign government officials
such as presidents, prime ministers, and other heads of state.117 However,
modern FCPA enforcement actions rarely involve such “foreign officials,”
but rather individuals deemed “foreign officials” under creative enforcement
theories not generally subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.
For instance, as highlighted in Table XIII below, eight corporate FCPA
enforcement actions involved foreign healthcare workers.
Table XIII – 2016 Corporate Enforcement Actions Involving Foreign
Healthcare Workers
Enforcement Action

Alleged “Foreign Officials”118

SciClone

“Healthcare professionals . . . who were employed
by state-owned hospitals in China”119

Olympus

Healthcare professionals in Brazil, Bolivia,
Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica120

116
See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (last visited Oct. 15, 2017)
https://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ (click on “Why has FCPA enforcement generally increased?”).
117
See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 934
(discussing the events that prompted the passage of the FCPA and the types of foreign officials involved
in those events).
118
Certain of the enforcement actions technically only involved FCPA books and records and
internal control charges or findings. However, actual charges in many FCPA enforcement actions hinge
on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues. Thus, even if
an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, most such actions remain
very much about the “foreign officials” involved—a fact evident when reading the actual enforcement
action.
119
SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., File No. 3-17101, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2016).
120
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Olympus Latin America, Inc., No. 163525(MF) at A5–A13 (D. N.J. Mar. 1, 2016) (including healthcare professionals in Brazil, Bolivia,
Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica).
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Nordion

“Russian government officials to obtain approval
for TheraSphere” (the company’s liver cancer
treatment product)121

Novartis

Chinese healthcare professionals122

Analogic

Individuals at “hospitals or other medical facilities
that were controlled by the government of
Russia”123

AstraZeneca

“Health care providers, at state-owned and statecontrolled entities in China and Russia”124

GlaxoSmithKline

Healthcare professionals in China125

Teva Pharma

Russian official described as a high-ranking
government official in the Russian Federation
who held official positions on government
committees and who had the ability to influence
matters related to the purchase of pharmaceutical
products by the Russian government, including
purchases made during annual auctions held by
the Russian Ministry of Health
Ukrainian official described as a high-ranking
official within the Ukrainian Ministry of Health
who held official positions at government
agencies and on government committees and who
could take official action on, and exert official
influence over, matters related to the registration
and pricing of pharmaceutical products in Ukraine
Physicians and other healthcare providers at stateowned and state-managed hospitals and healthcare
facilities in Mexico126

121

See Nordion Inc., File No. 3-17153, at 3 (Mar. 3, 2016) (“Russian government officials to obtain
approval for TheraSphere.”).
122
See Novartis AG, File No. 3-17177, at 3 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2016) (centering on
the action of Chinese healthcare professionals).
123
Analogic Non-Prosecution Agreement, at A-2 (Dep’t of Justice June 21, 2016).
124
AstraZeneca PLC, File No. 3-17517, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2016).
125
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, File No. 3-17606, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 30, 2016).
126
Press Release No. 16-1522, Dep’t of Justice, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees to Pay
More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-millionresolve-foreign-corrupt.
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Because pharmaceutical and other healthcare companies risk debarment
from U.S. government healthcare programs upon actual conviction of a
federal crime, it is not surprising that all of the above companies agreed to
resolve their alleged FCPA scrutiny through SEC administrative actions
and/or DOJ non-prosecution or deferred prosecution (resolution vehicles
which generally do not implicate debarment).127 Although the enforcement
theory that individuals associated with foreign healthcare systems are
“foreign officials” on par with presidents and prime ministers was first used
in an FCPA enforcement action in 2002,128 including the eight corporate
enforcement actions from 2016, this enforcement theory has been used in
approximately twenty-five corporate enforcement actions.129
None of these corporate actions based on this creative enforcement
theory were subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny. However, a useful
data point in examining the legitimacy and validity of this enforcement
theory is examining whether it has been used in any individual FCPA
enforcement action. The answer is no, and this is meaningful because
individuals, as opposed to business organizations, are more likely to contest
FCPA charges and put the enforcement agencies to their respective burdens
of proof.
2. Internship and Hiring Practices
The FCPA has specific elements that must be met in order for there to
be a violation. With increasing frequency, however, it appears that the DOJ
and SEC have transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all corporate
ethics statute in which any conduct the enforcement agencies find
objectionable is fair game to extract a multi-million-dollar settlement from
a risk-averse corporation.
An instructive example in 2016 was the $202.6-million FCPA
enforcement action against JPMorgan based on alleged improper hiring and
internship practices in the Asia-Pacific region. After discussing the main
features of the problematic enforcement action, this section highlights why
the SEC’s enforcement action finding violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery,
books and records, and internal controls provisions represents a trifecta of

127
See DAVID W. OGDEN & ELISEBETH COLLINS COOK, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
THE EXCLUSION ILLUSION: FIXING A FLAWED HEALTH CARE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 2–3 (2012)
(describing the current FCPA enforcement system of “huge out-of-court settlements”),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/The-ExclusionIllusion.pdf.
128
See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Syncor Int’l Corp., No. 1:02CV02421 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2002),
Litigation Release No. 17887 (Dec. 10, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm
(discussing a 2002 DOJ and SEC enforcement action against Syncor as the first action based on the
“foreign official” theory).
129
Id.
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off-the-rails FCPA enforcement and why anyone who values the rule of law
should be alarmed.130
To best understand how the JPMorgan enforcement action represents
off-the-rails FCPA enforcement, a brief overview of the FCPA’s statutory
framework and key elements is first provided. Generally speaking, the
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation are: (i) paying or offering money
or anything of value, (ii) with a corrupt intent, (iii) to a foreign official, and
(iv) for purposes of influencing the foreign official in order to obtain or
retain business.131 While the FCPA does not specifically define the term
“corrupt,” legislative history instructs that the term was “used in order to
make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to
induce the recipient to misuse his official position” and “connotes an evil
motive or purpose.”132 The FCPA contains so-called third party payment
provisions that further prohibit money or things of value given to “any
person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign
official.”133
In addition to the above elements specific to the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions, it is black-letter law that legal liability does not ordinarily hop,
skip, and jump around a multinational company absent limited exceptions
due to abuse of corporate form or other alter ego factors. In short, separate
legal entities (including even those within the same corporate hierarchy) are
not liable for the legal liability of other entities (whether that liability arises
in tort, contract or under the FCPA).
Regarding parent company liability for subsidiary conduct, even the
2012 FCPA Guidance issued by the DOJ and SEC stated:
There are two ways in which a parent company may be liable
for bribes paid by its subsidiary. First, a parent may have
participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly liable for
the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its subsidiary’s
misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe
scheme. Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s
conduct under traditional agency principles. The fundamental
characteristic of agency is control. Accordingly, DOJ and SEC
evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s
knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both
130
Based on the same core conduct as the SEC enforcement action, the DOJ also entered into a
non-prosecution agreement with JPMorgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited pursuant to which the
company agreed to pay a $72-million criminal penalty. While this section focuses on the SEC’s
enforcement action, the DOJ enforcement action is problematic for many of the same reasons discussed
in this section.
131
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 et seq. (2012).
132
H.R. REP. NO. 95–640, at 7 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
133
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a)(3).
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generally and in the context of the specific transaction—when
evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the parent.134
Relevant to agency principles, the Supreme Court recently held that just
because a subsidiary may have engaged in conduct that is “sufficiently
important” to the parent company does not mean that the subsidiary’s
conduct is imputed to the parent company.135
The FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions
specifically state that issuers shall:
[M]ake and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer . . . [D]evise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions are
executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to
permit preparation of financial statements inconformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only
in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences . . .
.136
The FCPA defines “reasonable assurances” and “reasonable detail” to
mean “such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”137 Regarding the books and
records
provisions,
the
SEC
has
stated:
[R]ecords which are not relevant to accomplishing the
objectives specified in the statute for the system of internal
controls are not within the purview of the recordkeeping
provision . . . .138

134

CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 27 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy
/2015/01/16/guide.pdf (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
135
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014).
136
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
137
Id. § 78m(b)(7) (2012).
138
Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the SEC Developments
Conference for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Jan. 13, 1981),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/011381williams.pdf (emphasis added).
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[T]his provision is not an independent and unrestrained
mandate to the [SEC] to establish novel or unprecedented
corporate recordkeeping standards; it is, rather, an integral part
of Congress' efforts to assure that the business community
records transactions and assets in such a way as to maintain
adequate control over them. And, this leads to two important
conclusions: First, the [FCPA] does not establish any absolute
standard of exactitude for corporate records. And, second,
records which are not related to internal or external audits or
to the four internal control objectives set forth in the [FCPA]
are not within the purview of the [FCPA’s] accounting
provisions.139
Likewise, in the 2012 FCPA Guidance the DOJ and SEC state:
The FCPA’s accounting provisions operate in tandem with the
anti-bribery provisions and prohibit off-the-books accounting.
Company management and investors rely on a company’s
financial statements and internal accounting controls to ensure
transparency in the financial health of the business, the risks
undertaken, and the transactions between the company and its
customers and business partners. The accounting provisions
are designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate
books and records and the reliability of the audit
process which constitute the foundations of our system of
corporate disclosure.140
Regarding the internal controls provisions, SEC v. World-Wide Coin, the
only judicial decision that directly addresses the substance of the provisions,
states:
The definition of accounting controls does comprehend
reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives
expressed in it will be accomplished by the system. . . . It does
not appear that either the SEC or Congress, which adopted the
SEC’s recommendations, intended that the statute should
require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe accounting
control system at all costs.141
Similarly, the SEC’s most extensive guidance on the internal controls
provisions states in pertinent part:
The Act does not mandate any particular kind of internal
controls system. The test is whether a system, taken as a
139

Id. (emphasis added).
CRIM. DIV., supra note 137 at 47 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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whole, reasonably meets the statute’s specified objectives.
“‘Reasonableness,’” a familiar legal concept, depends on an
evaluation of all the facts and circumstances. . . . The
accounting provisions principal objective is to reaching
knowing or reckless conduct.142
It is against this backdrop that the SEC brought an enforcement action
against JPMorgan based on alleged improper hiring and internship practices
in the Asia-Pacific region.143 The administrative order, not subjected to any
judicial scrutiny, found in summary fashion that:
Investment bankers at JPMorgan’s subsidiary in Asia,
JPMorgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (“JPMorgan
APAC”), created a client referral hiring program to leverage
the promise of well-paying, career building JPMorgan
employment for the relatives and friends of senior officials
with its clients in order to assist JPMorgan APAC in obtaining
or retaining business.144
According to the SEC, many of JPMorgan APAC’s clients were stateowned entities and the jobs and internships to relatives and friends of alleged
“foreign officials” constituted a “personal benefit to the requesting officials

142
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release No. 17500, 21 S.E.C. Docket
1466 (Jan. 29, 1981) (emphasis added).
143
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle
FCPA Charges (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.htm. Prior to the
JPMorgan action, the SEC brought two similar FCPA enforcement actions focused on alleged improper
hiring and internship practices. In August 2015, the SEC found in an administrative order not subjected
to any judicial scrutiny that BNY Mellon violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery and internal controls
provisions by providing “valuable internships to family members of foreign government officials
affiliated with a Middle Eastern sovereign wealth fund.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges
BNY
Mellon
with
FCPA
Violations
(Aug.
18,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s
findings, BNY Mellon agreed to pay $14.8 million to resolve the action. Id. Similarly, in March 2016 the
SEC found that Qualcomm violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls
provisions for providing or offering “full-time employment and paid internships to family members and
other referrals of foreign officials.” Qualcomm Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 77261, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 3751, 2016 WL 792232, at 5 (Mar. 1, 2016). Without admitting
or denying the SEC’s findings, Qualcomm agreed to pay $7.5 million to resolve the action. Id. An
interesting aspect of the Qualcomm enforcement action is that the company maintained during its FCPA
scrutiny that it was in compliance with the FCPA. Id. For instance, even when Qualcomm’s FCPA
scrutiny escalated in March 2014 upon receiving a Wells Notice from the SEC, the company disclosed
that it responded to the SEC “explaining why the Company believes it has not violated the FCPA and
therefore enforcement action is not warranted.” Id. Thereafter, in November 2015 Qualcomm continued
to insist in the midst of the SEC’s inquiry that it had not violated the FCPA and that an enforcement
action was not warranted. Id.
144
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3824, 2016 WL 6804113 (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79335.pdf.
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in order to obtain or retain investment banking business or other benefits
from the firm.”145
While the SEC’s order contains extensive findings regarding JPMorgan
APAC personnel (a separate and distinct legal entity from JPMorgan), the
order contains nary a meaningful substantive finding regarding individuals
at JPMorgan (the actual respondent in the SEC’s action). At the risk of
stating the obvious, this is an important point to consider from the SEC’s
order because there was no finding or inference that anyone at JPMorgan
had corrupt intent, a required statutory element.
Indeed, the SEC’s many other findings about JPMorgan’s FCPA
compliance program strongly suggest the absence of corrupt intent. For
instance, the SEC acknowledged, among other things: that JPMorgan
“recognized the FCPA risks in hiring the relatives of foreign government
officials,” “took steps to educate its employees on the potential dangers,”
and “instituted training for employees in the [APAC] region specifying that
pre-clearance from compliance was required before JPMorgan APAC could
hire Referral Hires . . . .”146 Rather, the order simply states in conclusory
fashion that “JPMorgan violated the anti-bribery provisions of the federal
securities laws by corruptly providing valuable internships and employment
to relatives and friends of foreign government officials in order to assist
JPMorgan in retaining and obtaining business.”147
In other words, the SEC allowed legal liability to hop, skip, and jump
around JPMorgan’s organizational structure even though—to use the terms
found in the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA Guidance—there were no findings that
JPMorgan itself “participated sufficiently in the activity,” “directed its
subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe
scheme,” or had “knowledge and direct[ed] the subsidiary’s actions.” In
prior recent FCPA enforcement actions, the SEC has articulated alter ego
agency theories of liability based on the facts to hold a parent company liable
for its subsidiary’s conduct.148 The absence of such findings in the JPMorgan
enforcement action would seem to suggest that such facts simply did not
exist.
Commenting on this aspect of the JPMorgan enforcement action, FCPA
practitioners at Debevoise & Plimpton stated:
For at least 90 years, it has been black letter law that a wholly
owned subsidiary is not an agent merely by virtue of
ownership, and agency between a parent and subsidiary is
seldom a basis for ignoring the corporate form as agency is a
145
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consensual relationship. Instead, the corporate distinction
between a parent and subsidiary can be disregarded only when
the parent “authoriz[es]” the activity (as provided for in the
FCPA itself) or where the parent has ignored the corporate
formalities such that the distinction between the companies is
mere form. Neither of these circumstances is alleged in the
[JPMorgan enforcement action]. There is no basis for
suggesting that the term “agent” in the FCPA should be
interpreted to differ from the common law meaning.149
Even if the corrupt intent of JPMorgan APAC employees could
somehow be imputed to JPMorgan (and black letter law strongly cautions
against this), the problematic issue still remains: as required by the antibribery provisions, what thing of value did the alleged Chinese “foreign
officials” receive?
Surely the internships and jobs constituted a thing of value to the
individuals who received them, but the FCPA’s statutory provisions clearly
state that the thing of value must go “to” a foreign official.150 Perhaps
recognizing this statutory requirement, the SEC creatively found that the
internships and jobs to relatives were a “personal benefit to the requesting
officials.” Whether a court would agree with this dubious assertion is an
open question (as are many other issues in certain recent FCPA enforcement
actions) because there was no judicial scrutiny of the SEC’s enforcement
action against JPMorgan.
Notwithstanding this salient fact and the other above-described legal
deficiencies in the SEC’s enforcement action, then SEC Director of
Enforcement Andrew Ceresney boldly proclaimed:
In the wake of some of the Commission’s prior hiring practices
cases, including our cases against Bank of New York Mellon
and Qualcomm, some questioned whether providing
internships could amount to an FCPA violation. But the
JPMorgan case should put that debate to rest.151
Exercising leverage against risk-averse corporations to extract a
settlement amount on a disputed legal theory in the absence of judicial
scrutiny puts little to rest other than the fact that the government possesses
leverage. Indeed, around the same time the JPMorgan enforcement action
was resolved in the absence of judicial scrutiny, there was judicial scrutiny
of the same enforcement narrative in two cases.
In the first case, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) brought a civil
action in a United Kingdom court against Goldman Sachs to rescind certain
149
Beyond “Sons and Daughters”: JPMorgan Resolves Hiring Practices Probe, FCPA UPDATE
(Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, NY), Nov. 2016, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted).
150
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012).
151
Ceresney, supra note 77.
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transactions and to obtain the repayment of premiums from Goldman
Sachs.152 The LIA’s main claim asserted that Goldman Sachs procured the
LIA to enter into the transactions by the exercise of undue influence, and as
to a certain transaction (the so-called April Trades), the LIA alleged that
Goldman Sachs improperly influenced the deputy chairman of the LIA,
Mustafa Zarti, to cause the LIA to agree to the trades by offering his younger
brother, Haitem Zarti, a prestigious internship at the bank. 153 However, the
judge concluded:
In my judgment it is going much too far to say that the
internship influenced Mr. Zarti to place more business with
Goldman Sachs than he otherwise would have done or that the
offer had a material influence over the LIA’s decision to enter
into the April Trades. . . . I find that Mr Mustafa Zarti was keen
for his younger brother to work as an intern, though there is no
evidence as to why he thought this was important. Although
the offer of the internship may have contributed to a friendly
and productive atmosphere during the negotiation of the April
Trades, it did not have a material influence on the decision of
Mr. Zarti and the LIA to enter into the April Trades.154
In the second case, United States v. Tavares, the government alleged that
defendants ran a corrupt hiring scheme at the Massachusetts Office of the
Commissioner of Probation (OCP) by catering to the hiring requests from
members of the state legislature with the hope of obtaining favorable
legislation for the Department of Probation and OCP.155 At trial, the
defendants were convicted of various criminal offenses and an appeal
followed. The First Circuit began its opinion by noting that the defendants
“misran the Probation Department and made efforts to conceal the patronage
hiring system.”156 However, the court noted “bad men, like good men, are
entitled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with the law” and that “not
all unappealing conduct is criminal.”157
In short, the First Circuit found that the “government had not in fact
demonstrated that the conduct satisfies the appropriate criminal statutes.”158
Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California, the court stated that the “government must prove a
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link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific
official act for or because of which it was given.”159 The court next stated:
In that vein, the Government cannot show the requisite linkage
merely be demonstrating that the gratuity was given ‘to build
a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately affect one or
more of a multitude of unspecified acts, now and in the future.
. . . The Government’s evidence as to the gratuities predicates
does not show adequate linkage between the thing of
“substantial value” conferred by [defendant] (the jobs) and an
“official act” performed or to be performed. . . . Many of the
Government’s arguments are predicated on bootstrapping:
because [defendant] was constantly conferring with legislators
and hiring based on legislative preferences, any “official act”
taken by an affected legislator must satisfy the nexus
requirement. But we do not read the gratuities statute so
broadly: the Supreme Court in Sun–Diamond “offered a
strictly worded requirement that the government show a link
to a ‘specific official act’ to supply a limiting principle that
would distinguish an illegal gratuity from a legal one,” a
principle unnecessary “in the extortion or bribery
contexts.” Given a choice between treating a gratuities statute
as “a meat axe or a scalpel,” the Supreme Court chose the
latter, and we follow suit.160
Just because two courts recently rejected narratives similar to the
JPMorgan enforcement narrative does not of course definitely prove that the
SEC’s case, if subjected to judicial scrutiny, would have failed to establish
an FCPA anti-bribery violation. It is hard to ignore, however, the parallels
from the two recent contested actions including the First Circuit’s reminder
that “not all unappealing conduct” is in violation of potentially relevant
statutes.161 Yet, it sure seems that the enforcement agencies have
transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all corporate ethics statute in
which any conduct the enforcement agencies find objectionable is fair game
to extract a multi-million-dollar settlement from a risk-averse corporation,
and the JPMorgan action is merely the latest example.162
Because the DOJ or SEC rarely face the prospect of judicial scrutiny in
FCPA enforcement actions, they have, in certain circumstances, used the
FCPA as a meat axe rather than a scalpel. The cure for “meat-axe”
159
Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999)
(internal citations omitted)).
160
Id. at 55–56 (internal citations omitted).
161
Id. at 49–53.
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enforcement is judicial scrutiny, but because of how the DOJ and SEC have
chosen to enforce the FCPA (largely through resolution vehicles not
subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny), and given the dynamics of
corporate settlements, the meat-axe approach to FCPA enforcement prevails
regardless of: Congressional intent in enacting the FCPA; the FCPA’s
statutory provisions; other relevant legal principles; and whether or not a
court would agree. The SEC’s finding that JPMorgan violated the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions is merely one component of the trifecta of off-therails FCPA enforcement represented by the JPMorgan enforcement action.
A second component relates to the SEC’s finding that JPMorgan
violated the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Under the heading
“books and records violations,” the SEC’s order stated:
JPMorgan violated the books and records provisions of the
FCPA in conjunction with certain Referral Hires. Under [the
books and records provisions] JPMorgan was required to make
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer. JPMorgan APAC’s
controls required that investment bankers submit accurate
questionnaires to compliance for review before client referrals
from SOEs and foreign government officials could be hired.
Contrary to that requirement, JPMorgan APAC personnel
submitted, reviewed, and approved inaccurate compliance
questionnaires containing false and incomplete information
which failed to disclose the intended, improper purpose of
making certain client Referral Hires. JPMorgan’s internal
records also inaccurately reflected the true number of client
Referral Hires in the APAC region by taking steps to withhold
certain headcount information relating to Referral Hires.163
Elsewhere the SEC stated:
JPMorgan also violated the books and records provisions of
the FCPA. JPMorgan APAC personnel created and
implemented a system by which inaccurate or incomplete
questionnaires were submitted, reviewed, and approved by
compliance in contravention of the internal policy created to
prevent improper hiring of Referral Hires. The records
reflected that they were hired for legitimate business purposes
rather than as hires made to improperly benefit JPMorgan
APAC investment banking business. JPMorgan APAC’s
internal records also inaccurately reflected the true number of
163
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3824, 2016 WL 6804113 (Nov. 17, 2016),
at 21 (emphasis added).
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client Referral Hires in the APAC region by taking steps to
disguise the headcount relating to Referral Hires from others
within the firm.164
However, the only books and records the SEC found to be problematic
were JPMorgan APAC questionnaires and other internal records related to
its internship and hiring program. No JPMorgan books or records were
found to be problematic and even the problematic JPMorgan APAC books
and records are clearly not financial or accounting documents which reflect
“transactions and disposition of the assets” of JPMorgan as required by the
FCPA’s provisions. Recall, in the words of the SEC itself: “records which
are not relevant to accomplishing the objectives specified in the statute for
the system of internal controls are not within the purview of the
recordkeeping provision.”165
The observation of FCPA practitioner and former DOJ prosecutor
Michael Schachter prior to the recent internship and hiring enforcement
actions seems particularly appropriate: “[T]he books and records provision
is, in fact, narrower than the Justice Department and the SEC interpretations
suggest. . . . [B]oth agencies may be using the provision to punish behavior
falling outside the FCPA’s reach.”166
Tellingly, and perhaps in recognition of the FCPA’s statutory provisions
and prior SEC guidance, in the prior BNY Mellon internship enforcement
action, the SEC cited several internal documents in connection with the
company’s problematic internship practices, but did not find that BNY
Mellon violated the FCPA’s books and records provisions. If nothing else,
the SEC’s finding that BNY Mellon did not violate the provisions, but that
JPMorgan did, represents inconsistent law enforcement and is just as
alarming for rule of law purposes.
The third component of the trifecta of off-the-rails FCPA enforcement
represented by the JPMorgan enforcement action relates to the SEC’s
finding that JPMorgan violated the FCPA’s internal controls provisions.
However, the SEC’s order contained an entire section titled “JP
Morgan’s Policies Prohibited the Hiring of Client Referrals in Exchange for
Business,” which found in pertinent part as follows: (1) JPMorgan
recognized the FCPA risk of hiring the relative of foreign officials and
thereafter took steps to educate employees, including those at JPMorgan
APAC, on the potential risk including specific training examples concerning
the risk; (2) JPMorgan’s anti-corruption policy explicitly prohibited hiring
individuals to win business and required legal and compliance pre-clearance
for internships or training for relatives of public officials and JPMorgan
164
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APAC specifically trained employees on the risk including that preclearance from compliance was required.167
Nevertheless, under the heading “internal controls violations,” the
SEC’s order stated:
JPMorgan violated the internal accounting controls provisions
of the FCPA in conjunction with certain Referral Hires.
JPMorgan failed to devise and maintain an effective system of
internal accounting controls. JPMorgan’s internal accounting
controls were insufficiently designed to prevent the corruption
risks inherent in the hiring of Referral Hires, and therefore
inadequate to enforce or effectuate JPMorgan’s referral hiring
policy. JPMorgan recognized the inherent risks in hiring
Referral Hires, yet proceeded with a system that failed
adequately to address those risks. The safeguards put in place
by JPMorgan APAC to minimize compliance and FCPA risks
were not effective to curb the true purpose of the Client
Referral Program. JPMorgan APAC’s referral hiring
questionnaire was designed to ensure that Referral Hires were
hired based on merit and not for improper purposes. However,
in practice the Client Referral Program operated as a separate
tier of employment within JPMorgan APAC where hiring and
retention decisions were based on client relationships and
potential revenue and not employee merit. . . . JPMorgan
APAC attempted to put in place protections to mitigate the
inherent conflicts and FCPA risks in hiring Referral Hires.
However, these protections were insufficient to prevent the
violations.168
The SEC’s findings are alarming on several levels. For starters, the
statutory standard is that JPMorgan was required to have internal accounting
controls “sufficient to provide reasonable assurance” that the statutory
objectives are met, with “reasonable” specifically defined to mean “such
level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in
the conduct of their own affairs.”169 The SEC’s finding that JPMorgan
lacked an “effective system of internal controls” or that its controls were
“insufficient to prevent” or detect the problematic internships or hires are
simply standards that do not exist in the FCPA.
Not only are these SEC-articulated standards not found in the FCPA, but
the only judicial decision to directly address the substance of the internal
controls provisions specifically states that “[t]he definition of accounting
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controls . . . comprehend[s] reasonable, but not absolute, assurances . . . .”170
Moreover, even SEC guidance relevant to the internal controls provisions
states that the “accounting provisions principal objective is to reach knowing
or reckless conduct” by the issuer.171
Further alarming is that many of the internal controls the SEC found
most problematic were those of JPMorgan APAC, not JPMorgan the actual
respondent in the SEC’s enforcement action. Per the SEC’s own findings,
JPMorgan had existing internal controls relevant to internship and hiring
practices but JPMorgan APAC employees acted in contravention of
company policy and failed to follow the firm’s internal accounting controls.
Per the SEC’s own findings, JPMorgan APAC employees “often provided
inaccurate or incomplete information as part of the legal and compliance
review designed to prevent these violations or withheld key information so
that the Referral Hires would pass compliance review” and otherwise
“provided inaccurate or incomplete answers to secure approval for hires
without revealing the links to business as a result of certain Referral
Hires.”172
Against this backdrop, it is nothing short of astonishing that the SEC
found JPMorgan in violation of the internal controls provisions which
require issuers to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that the statutory
objectives are satisfied.173 Even more astonishing is how SEC enforcement
officials described JP Morgan’s conduct (as opposed to JPMorgan APAC’s
conduct) in its press release announcing the enforcement action. In the words
of then SEC Director of Enforcement Ceresney:
JPMorgan engaged in a systematic bribery scheme by hiring
children of government officials and other favored referrals
who were typically unqualified for the positions on their own
merit. JPMorgan employees knew the firm was potentially
violating the FCPA yet persisted with the improper hiring
program because the business rewards and new deals were
deemed too lucrative.174
Kara Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA
Unit) stated:
The misconduct was so blatant that JPMorgan investment
bankers created ‘Referral Hires vs Revenue’ spreadsheets to
track the money flow from clients whose referrals were
170
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rewarded with jobs. The firm’s internal controls were so weak
that not a single referral hire request was denied.175
The merging of conduct of two separate and distinct legal entities,
particularly given the actual findings in the SEC’s order, should be alarming
to anyone who values the rule of law. Perhaps it is not astonishing though
when one recognizes that FCPA enforcement is not necessarily about the
law and facts, but a game of risk aversion in which issuers have little appetite
for putting their primary financial regulator to its burden of proof. As the
Second Circuit has observed, “trials are primarily about the truth” whereas
other forms of SEC settlement “are primarily about pragmatism.”176
What is interesting about the JP Morgan enforcement action and
numerous other SEC FCPA enforcement actions in recent years that have
been resolved in the absence of any judicial scrutiny is that they have occurred
during the leadership of Mary Jo White. As Chair of the SEC, White rightly
noted that the “public airing of facts, literally in open court, creates
accountability for both defendants and the government.”177 White further
stated:
How we resolve disputes and how we decide the guilt or
innocence of an accused are the true measure of our
democracy. . . . [T]rials allow for more thoughtful and nuanced
interpretations of the law in a way that settlements and
summary judgments cannot. . . . [T]he death of trials would…
remove a source of disciplined information about matters of
public significance . . . [i]t would mean the end of an
irreplaceable public forum and would mean that more of the
legal order would proceed behind closed doors.178
Of further interest is that some of the most forceful commentary about
the SEC’s internship and hiring practice inquiries has come from former
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt who stated in a Wall Street Journal op-ed:
[SEC] regulators now suggest that such hiring overseas is a
form of untoward influence, akin to bribing foreign officials to
win business. The accusation is scurrilous and hypocritical. If
you walk the halls of any institution in the U.S.—Congress,
federal courthouses, large corporations, the White House,
American embassies and even the offices of the SEC—you are
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likely to run into friends and family members of powerful and
wealthy people.179
Even a New York Times columnist (hardly a media source to often
question aggressive SEC enforcement) stated after JPMorgan’s FCPA
scrutiny surfaced:
But hiring the sons and daughters of powerful executives and
politicians is hardly just the province of banks doing business
in China: it has been a time-tested practice here in the United
States.180
Double standard issues aside, it is difficult to square existing legal
authority, as well as enforcement agency guidance, with the findings in the
JPMorgan enforcement action, and anyone who values the rule of law should
be alarmed. Indeed, one of the supreme ironies of the JPMorgan enforcement
action is that JPMorgan’s counsel was Mark Mendelsohn, the former DOJ
FCPA Unit Chief and self-described “architect” of the DOJ’s “modern
[FCPA] enforcement program.”181 According to reports, during the
settlement negotiation process Mendelsohn reportedly authored a white
paper submitted to the DOJ and SEC setting out the bank’s concern about
the enforcement approach.182
Sure, JPMorgan could have forced the SEC to prove its enforcement
theories to someone other than itself. But for that to happen, the SEC would
have first had to file a civil complaint in federal court—an event which
surely would have caused the company’s stock price to fall. As Andrew
Weissmann (DOJ Fraud Section Chief at the time of the JPMorgan action)
previously stated regarding the FCPA: “the grayness of a statute that is
enforced against corporations is particularly heinous because there’s no way
to actually have that litigated as a realistic matter.”183
Even if the drop to JPMorgan’s stock would have been small—say 3%
and short-lived—the hit to JPMorgan’s market capitalization, an important
data point for investors and an important metric by which business manager
performance is judged, would have been much higher than the $202.6179
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million settlement amount. Against this backdrop, resolving an FCPA
enforcement action (even if based on dubious theories of enforcement)
seems like a rational corporate decision in the best interest of shareholders.
Consider, however, the long-term effects of such corporate risk
aversion. In this regard, the alarming JPMorgan enforcement action should
serve as a reminder that the business community is, at least in part,
responsible for the current aggressive FCPA enforcement climate. Indeed,
as Homer Moyer (a dean of the FCPA bar) has observed:
One reality is the enforcement agencies' [FCPA] views on
issues and enforcement policies, positions on which they are
rarely challenged in court. The other is what knowledgeable
counsel believe the government could sustain in court, should
their interpretations or positions be challenged. The two may
not be the same. The operative rules of the game are the
agencies' views unless a company is prepared to go to court or
to mount a serious challenge within the agencies.184
There are many who cheer more FCPA enforcement regardless of the
enforcement theories. For these cheerleaders, there is much to cheer in the
JPMorgan enforcement action and its $202.6-million settlement amount will
be blindly inserted into FCPA enforcement statistics and trotted out at every
available opportunity to demonstrate how the U.S. is the leader in antibribery enforcement.
Yet for those who value the rule of law, there is much to lament in the
JPMorgan enforcement action. When speaking of FCPA enforcement, the
DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General previously delivered a speech titled
“International Criminal Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption
and Beyond.”185 As suggested by the title of the speech, the DOJ official
spoke about FCPA enforcement and how the increase in FCPA enforcement
was consistent with the U.S.’s global approach to promote the rule of law.
The speech began with two rhetorical questions: is the rule of law “more
than just a catch phrase” and “does the rule of law have any real meaning.”186
These are great questions to ask in the aftermath of the JPMorgan
enforcement action.
Regardless of the legitimacy of the JPMorgan enforcement action and
accepting the DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement theories at face value, there is
a compliance message to the business community in the enforcement action:
FCPA compliance is not just a legal function—not just a finance and
184
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auditing function—but also a human resources function. In overseeing
internship and hiring practices, human resources professionals should ask
the following questions to minimize FCPA scrutiny:
• Does the company’s anti-corruption policy explicitly address the
hiring of family members, relatives, etc. of “foreign officials”?
• Do HR employees receiving FCPA training?
• Does the company require that every application for a full-time hire
or an internship be routed through a centralized HR application
process?
• Does the company’s application process require that each applicant
indicate whether he/she is related to or otherwise connected to a
“foreign official” or has recently been a “foreign official”?
• Is a “foreign official” requesting that the company provide an
internship or job opportunity?
• Is there an actual open internship or job position or is the company
creating a new internship or job position?
• Does the internship or job applicant possess the requisite skills and
qualifications for such a position?
• Does the company’s Code of Conduct require that every year each
employee certify that he or she is not responsible for hiring through
a non-centralized channel?
C. FCPA Policy Developments
The year 2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse
FCPA enforcement activity often tied to expansive and evolving
enforcement theories, but for FCPA policy developments as well. As
discussed in this section, both the DOJ and SEC renewed their long-standing
FCPA enforcement commitment and the DOJ released a one-year FCPA
Pilot Program designed in large part to further motivate business
organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues to better facilitate
enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
Consistent with previous years, DOJ and SEC enforcement officials
renewed their commitment to robust FCPA enforcement. For instance,
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates stated: “At the Justice Department, we
are committed to ensuring that individuals and corporations in the
marketplace are operating on a level playing field. Deceit, fraud and
corruption distort that balance, and so it is important that we all do our part
to keep the scales evenly weighted.”187 Likewise, SEC Director of
Enforcement Andrew Ceresney stated: “Investigating and bringing
187
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enforcement actions for FCPA violations has been an important priority for
us at the SEC and we have taken a lead role in fighting corruption
worldwide.”188 Similarly, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated: “Vigorous
enforcement of the FCPA is a high priority for both the SEC and the
Department of Justice.”189
Beyond such unsurprising statements, the most notable enforcement
agency policy development of 2016 was the release of a DOJ policy
document titled “The Fraud Section’s FCPA Enforcement Plan and
Guidance.”190 The non-binding policy document outlined three steps in the
DOJ’s “enhanced FCPA enforcement strategy.”191 Two of the steps outlined
in the policy document (an increase in the DOJ’s and FBI’s FCPA resources
as well as the DOJ “strengthening its coordination with foreign
counterparts”) were previously articulated by the DOJ and thus represented
rather humdrum developments.192 The third step outlined by the DOJ, that
its Fraud Section “is conducting an FCPA enforcement pilot program,”193 is
the focus of this section which grades the pilot program by addressing the
following issues:
The obvious logical gap in the pilot program;
How the pilot program, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, is
really nothing new;
Why the corporate community should take the pilot program with
a grain of salt;
How the pilot program falls short of best achieving the laudable
goals articulated by the DOJ compared to other alternatives
previously advanced; and
The pilot program in practice including how the pilot program is
currently failing as measured against the DOJ’s “main goal” of the
program.
Logical Gap in the Pilot Program
Prior to addressing the obvious logical gap in the pilot program, it is
important to understand the informational gap which the pilot program seeks
to address. This gap is best demonstrated by the below picture.
188
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In other words, business organizations (whether through internal audits,
compliance hotlines, or other means) often possess information suggesting
that employees within the organization or third parties engaged by the
organization have violated the FCPA. Because business organizations
generally do not have a legal obligation to disclose this information, a fact
rightly recognized in the pilot program, the FCPA’s dual enforcers—the
DOJ and SEC—often do not learn about FCPA violations. Indeed, at the
pilot program press conference, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell
candidly admitted as much when she stated that the DOJ is “‘confident that
there are lots of FCPA violations’” that do not come to the DOJ’s
attention.194
In other words, there are likely many FCPA violations (at least based on
current enforcement theories) that occur in the global marketplace that are
not disclosed to the enforcement agencies. Because, such violations (again
in the eyes of the enforcement agencies) are not disclosed to the enforcement
agencies, there is no enforcement action. Because there is no enforcement
action, the individual or individuals engaging in the problematic conduct
will not be held legally accountable. Because the individuals are not being
held legally accountable, FCPA enforcement is not as effective as it could
be in achieving maximum deterrence.
As depicted in the picture above, the FCPA enforcement landscape thus
has a deep gorge and how to bridge this gorge has long perplexed the FCPA
enforcement agencies. As highlighted below, encouraging voluntary
disclosure by business organizations of FCPA violations has long been the
DOJ’s best answer. Indeed, in the words of previous DOJ officials, the DOJ
“absolutely needs companies through their firms to provide us with their
[FCPA] investigations”195 and in most years approximately 50% of
194
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corporate FCPA enforcement actions originate with voluntary
disclosures.196
The pilot program represented the DOJ’s latest attempt to encourage
voluntary disclosures and was “intended to encourage companies to disclose
FCPA misconduct to permit the prosecution of individuals whose criminal
wrongdoing might otherwise never be uncovered by or disclosed to law
enforcement.” In comments after the release of the pilot program, Caldwell
stated:
[The] idea of the Pilot Program, in part, is get the company to
self-report by giving it some incentives so that when it comes
in and self-reports, it will give us the information that it has
. . . that will in turn enable us to prosecute individuals because
we recognize that prosecution of individuals is the biggest
deterrent . . . to corporate wrongdoing, and criminal
wrongdoing . . . that is really one of the main goals of the Pilot
Program.197
This objective, however, suffers from an obvious logical gap in that for
years the DOJ has had the opportunity to do just what the pilot program
seeks to accomplish. Specifically, between 2011 and 2015, nineteen
corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions originated with voluntary
disclosures. However, in only five of those instances (26%) was there a
related DOJ prosecution of individuals. The DOJ’s stated objective in
establishing the pilot program thus seems to lack credibility for the simple
fact that if the goal of the pilot program is to encourage voluntary disclosures
to permit the DOJ to prosecute individuals, then why have 74% of corporate
DOJ FCPA enforcement actions over the past five years that originated with
a voluntary disclosure not resulted in any related DOJ prosecution of
individuals?198 Logical gap aside, it is important to recognize that the pilot
program, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, was really nothing new.
Nothing New in the Pilot Program
It’s been said that “there’s a sucker born every minute” and to some, the
pilot program represented a new DOJ policy. However, just because the DOJ
held a press conference to announce the pilot program and ascribed a new
label to pre-existing DOJ rhetoric and practice, this did not make the pilot
196
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program new. Knowledgeable observers quickly recognized this upon
digesting the specifics of the pilot program. For instance, former DOJ FCPA
Unit Chief Chuck Duross and former DOJ FCPA Unit Assistant Chief James
Koukios stated: “in fact, there is not much that is new in the guidance.”199
Indeed, for over a decade the DOJ has encouraged voluntary disclosure of
FCPA violations coupled with repeated assurances that voluntary disclosure
will result in meaningful credit.
For instance, in 2006 then-DOJ Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher
stated:
When serious FCPA issues do arise, we strongly encourage
you and your clients to voluntarily disclose those issues. . . .
[W]hat I can say is that there is always a benefit to corporate
cooperation, including voluntary disclosure . . . . The fact is, if
you are doing the things you should be doing—whether it is
self-policing, self-reporting, conducting proactive risk
assessments, improving your controls and procedures, training
on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation after it
starts—you will get a benefit. It may not mean that you or your
client will get a complete pass, but you will get a real, tangible
benefit.200
Likewise, in 2009 then DOJ Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
stated:
I strongly urge any corporation that discovers an FCPA
violation to seriously consider making a voluntary disclosure
and always to cooperate with the Department. The Sentencing
Guidelines and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations obviously encourage such conduct,
and the Department has repeatedly stated that a company will
receive meaningful credit for that disclosure and that
cooperation.201
Indeed, one of Breuer’s favorite talking points on the FCPA circuit was
to encourage voluntary disclosure of FCPA violations and offer repeated
assurances that it would result in meaningful credit by the DOJ. In 2009,
199
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Breuer stated: “I want to assure you that the Department’s commitment to
meaningfully reward voluntary disclosures and full and complete corporate
cooperation will continue to be honored in both letter and spirit.”202 In
another 2010 FCPA speech, Breuer stated: “If you come forward and if you
fully cooperate with our investigation, you will receive meaningful credit for
having done so.”203 In yet another 2010 FCPA speech, Breuer stated:
As a former defense lawyer, I understand that the question of
whether to self-report is a difficult one. But I can assure you
that if you do not voluntarily disclose your organization’s
conduct, and we discover it on our own, or through a
competitor or a customer of yours, the result will not be the
same . . . . [T]here is no doubt that a company that comes
forward on its own will see a more favorable resolution than
one that doesn’t.204
In a 2013 FCPA speech, then Deputy Attorney General James Cole
stated:
What is the benefit of voluntary disclosure and cooperation?
We fully understand that companies will act in their own best
interest. So we have sought to incentivize companies with
tangible benefits for their voluntary disclosure and
cooperation—beyond the reductions already built into the
Sentencing Guidelines. Such benefits have taken the form of
declinations . . . , resolutions short of a guilty plea like deferred
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, and
allowing companies to self-report their remediation efforts
instead of being subject to the oversight of a corporate
monitor. We have also, in appropriate cases, supported
reduced penalties below those suggested by the Sentencing
Guidelines.205
Bringing DOJ rhetoric on this issue to the months leading up to the pilot
program, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell stated in November 2015:
[V]oluntary self-disclosure in the FCPA context does have
particular value to the department. Because of that, we want to
202
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encourage self-disclosure by making clear that, when
combined with cooperation and remediation, voluntary
disclosure does provide a tangible benefit when it comes time
to make a charging decision.206
Albert Einstein is credited with saying that insanity is “doing the same
thing over and over again and expecting different results.” You don’t need
to be an Einstein to realize, as the above examples clearly demonstrate, that
the main thrust of the pilot program (that is to encourage voluntary
disclosure through meaningful credit) was nothing new as the DOJ has been
saying the same thing over and over again for a decade. If anything, the
DOJ’s latest attempt in the pilot program to encourage voluntary disclosure
should be viewed as an acknowledgement that the DOJ’s long-standing
efforts on this issue have not been as successful as hoped.
The rhetoric in the pilot program is not the only aspect of the program
that was not new. As discussed next, the substance of the pilot program was
also not new. The key language in the pilot program that the DOJ said it will
now use to encourage voluntary disclosure (along with cooperation and
timely and appropriate remediation) was set forth in two sections. The first
section addresses what may happen if a company voluntarily discloses,
cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates:
In such cases, if a criminal resolution is warranted, the Fraud
Section’s FCPA Unit: may accord up to a 50% reduction off
the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a
fine is sought; and generally should not require appointment
of a monitor if a company has, at the time of resolution,
implemented an effective compliance program. Where those
same conditions are met, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit will
consider a declination of prosecution. . . . To qualify for any
mitigation credit under this pilot . . . the company should be
required to disgorge all profits from the FCPA misconduct at
issue.207
The second section addressed what may happen if a company does not
voluntarily disclose, yet nevertheless cooperates and timely and
appropriately remediates:
If a company has not voluntarily disclosed its FCPA
misconduct . . . , it may receive limited credit under this pilot
206
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program if it later fully cooperates and timely and
appropriately remediates. Such credit will be markedly less
than that afforded to companies that do self-disclose
wrongdoing . . . Specifically, in circumstances where no
voluntary self-disclosure has been made, the Fraud Section’s
FCPA Unit will accord at most a 25% reduction off the bottom
of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range.208
The specific percentages above that the DOJ may offer in the pilot
program are nothing new because there have been numerous instances, prior
to the pilot program, in which the DOJ resolved corporate FCPA
enforcement actions using the same thresholds it “may” use going forward.
Specifically, the DOJ had already offered companies that voluntarily
disclosed, cooperated, and remediated up to, and indeed over, a 50%
reduction off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines. Examples
include: Avon (58% below the minimum amount suggested by the
guidelines score) and Pride International (55% below the minimum amount
suggested by the guidelines score).209 Other enforcement actions that
originated with voluntary disclosure and involved the company cooperating
and effectively remediating came close to 50% or at the very least exceeded
25% off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines. Examples
include: ABB (38% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines
score), ADM (35% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines
score), and Pfizer (34% below the minimum amount suggested by the
guidelines score).210 In short, the carrot embedded in the pilot program for
voluntarily disclosing, cooperating, and remediating was really nothing new.
Nor is the other carrot embedded in the pilot program new (that is even
if there is no voluntary disclosure, a company that cooperates and remediates
may receive 25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines
score). For instance, the Data Systems and Solutions enforcement action did
not originate from a voluntary disclosure, yet the settlement amount was
30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines score.
Likewise, the HP enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary
disclosure, yet the DOJ settlement amount was 30% below the minimum
amount suggested by the guidelines score. Notably, the JGC of Japan
enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary disclosure nor did the
company fully and completely cooperate, yet the DOJ settlement amount
was 30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines score.
Further, the Technip enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary
208
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disclosure, yet the DOJ settlement amount was 25% below the minimum
amount suggested by the guidelines score.
In short, the numbers tell the true story and it is that both in terms of
rhetoric and substance, the DOJ’s FCPA pilot program was really nothing
new.211
This alone should cause the corporate community to yawn at the pilot
program. However, as highlighted below there were also several other
reasons why the corporate community should take the pilot program with a
grain of salt.
The Corporate Community Should Take the Pilot Program with a Grain
of Salt
To be clear, the corporate community should not ignore the pilot
program. After all, the DOJ has extreme leverage over business
organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny and it is always wise to at least be
cognizant of what an adversary possessing a big and sharp stick is saying.
Nevertheless, absent limited circumstances not often present in instances of
FCPA scrutiny, how to respond to internal breaches of FCPA compliance
policies is a business decision entrusted to those charged with managing the
business organization. In exercising this business judgment, the corporate
community should take the pilot program with a grain of salt for reasons
described above and for the additional four reasons described below.
First, the pilot program is non-binding and commits the DOJ to
absolutely nothing. Like prior DOJ guidance on the FCPA, such as the 2012
FCPA Guidance, the pilot program stated: “This memorandum is for internal
use only and does not create any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any individual, organization, party or witness
in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”212
Moreover, eligibility for the specific percentage reductions highlighted
above is contingent upon a company meeting the DOJ’s definition of
“voluntary self-disclosure,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate
remediation.” As to these key concepts, the DOJ possesses absolute,
unreviewable discretion in determining whether the concepts have been
satisfied to its satisfaction. In addition, the specific percentage reductions
are littered with qualifying discretionary terms such as “may” and “will
consider.” As FCPA practitioners have rightly observed, the pilot program
“is riddled with caveats that provide plenty of room for FCPA prosecutors
to award something less than full mitigation credit to a cooperating
211
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company.” Finally, the specific percentage thresholds in the pilot program
only address the final number that results from the sentencing guidelines
equation for determining a fine range. As knowledgeable observers
recognize, the reality is that this final number is the product of and
contingent upon several less-than-transparent discretionary calls made by
the DOJ earlier in the equation. Again, FCPA practitioners rightly observed
that even under the pilot program “prosecutors and agents continue to wield
significant discretion, and factors such as the severity of the underlying
conduct, the completeness of the disclosure, and the sufficiency of
remediation efforts are still likely to play a major role in determining the
disposition of the case.”214
The second reason why the corporate community should take the pilot
program with a grain of salt is perhaps obvious, but bears repeating: the DOJ
is an adversary. Imagine a business organization facing an adversary in other
legal actions and the adversary states that it “may” or “will consider” a lower
settlement amount should it prevail if the business organization acts
according to the adversary’s discretionary commands.215 It is doubtful that
any business organization, and rightly so, would accede to the demands of
this adversary. While the DOJ possesses bigger and sharper sticks than most
legal adversaries, the facts remain that the DOJ is an adversary to a business
organization under FCPA scrutiny and the business organization has no legal
or moral obligation to assist the DOJ. As the pilot program correctly noted:
“Nothing in the [pilot program] is intended to suggest that the government
can require business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, or
remediate. Companies remain free to reject these options and forego the
credit available under the pilot program.”216
The third reason why the corporate community, at least so-called issuers
under the FCPA, should take the pilot program with a grain of salt is that it
is an incomplete program because issuers are subject to FCPA enforcement
by both the DOJ and SEC, but the pilot program is a DOJ program only. To
be sure, just like the DOJ, the SEC has long encouraged voluntary disclosure
of FCPA violations coupled with repeated assurances that voluntary
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disclosure will result in meaningful credit. However, unless and until the
SEC articulates a similar FCPA program (a program that will likely suffer
from the same deficiencies as the DOJ’s program), the DOJ’s FCPA pilot
program addresses only half of the enforcement landscape facing issuers.
The fourth and perhaps biggest reason why the corporate community
should take the pilot program with a grain of salt is that it only addresses a
relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences to a
business organization that is the subject of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement.
For obvious reasons, settlement amounts in FCPA enforcement actions tend
to get the most attention. After all, settlement amounts are mentioned in
DOJ/SEC press releases, press releases generate media coverage, and the
corporate community reads the media. However, knowledgeable observers
recognize, as depicted in the below picture, that FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement results in “three buckets” of financial exposure to a business
organization.

In nearly every instance of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, bucket one
(pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses) is the largest
financial hit to a business organization. The reasons for this are both
practical and potentially provocative. In terms of the practical, all instances
of FCPA scrutiny have a point of entry. For instance, problematic conduct
in China that then often results in the “where else” question from the
enforcement agencies which often prompts the company under scrutiny to
conduct a much broader review. In terms of the provocative, FCPA scrutiny
can easily become a billing boondoggle for FCPA Inc. participants.
A couple of specific examples highlight how extensive pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses can become. For instance, Avon
resolved an FCPA enforcement action for $135 million in aggregate DOJ
and SEC settlement amounts, but disclosed approximately $550 million in
pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses (a 2.5:1 ratio compared to
217

Ceresney, supra note 77 (“The Commission launched its formal cooperation program a little
more five years ago, and . . . it has been a great success overall. Even before that . . . the SEC was
rewarding cooperation in FCPA matters, and it has continued to do so under the more formal program.”).
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the settlement amount).
Likewise, Bruker Corp. resolved an FCPA
enforcement action for $2.2 million, but disclosed approximately $22
million in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses (a 10:1
ratio).219 Perhaps most eye-popping, Hyperdynamics resolved an FCPA
enforcement action for $75,000, but disclosed approximately $12.7 million
in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses (a 170:1 ratio).220
Even if the pilot program was binding on the DOJ, which it is not, the
fact is the pilot program only addresses bucket two (settlement amount) and
does not address pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses—
the biggest financial hit to a business organization subject to FCPA scrutiny.
Sure, consistent with Assistant Attorney General Caldwell’s April 2015
speech that the DOJ “do[es] not expect companies to aimlessly boil the
ocean” in FCPA investigations,221 the pilot program does contain the
following footnote:
[A]bsent facts to suggest a more widespread problem,
evidence of criminality in one country, without more, would
not lead to an expectation that an investigation would need to
extend to other countries.222
Yet here again, the DOJ has been highlighting the excesses of FCPA
internal investigations (and pointing the finger at FCPA Inc. and not itself
as the root cause) for years prior to the pilot program with no observable
impact. For instance, in 2013 then-DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Charles Duross
called out FCPA Inc. at an American Bar Association event.
Duross suggested that other company lawyers are seeking to
over do it through a global search of operations for FCPA
issues. He discussed a case in which a company and its
professional advisors came to a meeting with a global search
plan and he said ‘no, no, no, that is not what I want.’ [Duross]
indicated that the lawyers and other professional advisors in

218
Mike Koehler, Issues to Consider from the Avon Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec.
22, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-the-avon-enforcement-action/.
219
See Bruker Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2015) (“In the fiscal years ended
December 31, 2014, 2013 and 2012, $3.2 million, $6.1 million and $11.1 million, respectively, was
recorded for legal and other professional services incurred related to the internal investigation of these
matters.”).
220
See Hyperdynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 22, 2016) (“We have been subject
to a Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission FCPA investigation into how we
obtained or retained the Concession and spent approximately $12.8 million in legal fees in working with
the US Government.”).
221
Caldwell, supra note 210.
222
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 6 n.5 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/838416/download.
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the room ‘looked unhappy,’ but the general counsel of the
company was happy.223
In addition to not meaningfully addressing bucket one, pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses, the pilot program also does not
meaningfully address bucket three, post-enforcement action professional
fees and expenses. Sure, the pilot program does state, consistent with the
DOJ’s prior rhetoric on the issue, that voluntary disclosure, cooperation and
remediation “generally should not require appointment of a monitor.”224 But
even FCPA enforcement actions resolved without a monitor typically
require reporting obligations by the business organization to the enforcement
agencies, and in some cases, “enhanced compliance obligations” complete
with audits.225 While bucket three is the smallest of the “three buckets” of
financial exposure, post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses,
even in garden-variety FCPA corporate enforcement actions, often exceed
millions of dollars per year for the one to three years of the requirements.
The corporate community needs to fully understand and appreciate that
the pilot program only addresses a relatively minor component of the overall
financial consequences that typically result from FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement. Related to this key point is the fact that a company (particularly
an issuer) subject to FCPA scrutiny and enforcement will often also
experience several other negative financial consequences above and beyond
the “three buckets” of financial exposure. Such financial consequences often
include a drop in market capitalization, an increase in the cost of capital, a
negative impact on merger and acquisition activity, lost or delayed business
opportunities, and shareholder litigation. In certain cases, these other
negative financial consequences can far exceed even the “three buckets” of
financial exposure discussed above.
In short, corporate leaders need to fully understand and appreciate (in
addition to the specific topics discussed above) that a voluntary disclosure
of potential FCPA violations is going to set into motion a wide-ranging
sequence of events that will be far costlier to the company than any marginal

223

Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:05 AM),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-93/.
224
THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND
GUIDANCE, supra note 226.
225
See generally Nathaniel Edmonds, Morgan Heavener & Ian Herbert, DOJ’s FCPA Enforcement
Plan Highlights the Need for Robust Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (April
2016),
https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/stay-current-doj-39-s-fcpaenforcement-plan-highlights-the-need-for-robust-anti-corruption-compliance-programs.pdf (explaining
enhanced compliance obligations); Gary DiBianco & Bernd R. Mayer, A Window to the U.S. –
Developments in Health Care and Life Sciences Investigations, Enforcement and Litigation, and the
Effects on Transactions 39, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (May 7, 2013),
https://files.skadden.com/eVites%2FFRA%2FWindowtotheUS_
DevelopmentsinHealthcare_PPT
_2.PDF (explaining FCPA “enhanced compliance obligations in pharma and device settlements”).
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benefit obtained through the pilot program’s non-binding promise of a
reduced settlement amount.226
No doubt there are some who are likely to respond that if a business
organization does not voluntarily disclose FCPA violations, it is likely that
the enforcement agencies will independently find out about the violations,
and when this happens the company is going to experience the same negative
financial consequences highlighted above plus, because of the lack of
voluntary disclosure, a larger settlement amount. However, this line of
reasoning represents pure speculation.227
Notwithstanding the many shortcomings in the pilot program, going
forward there no doubt will be companies (perhaps persuaded by FCPA
counsel eying lucrative billings that flow from voluntary disclosures) that
choose to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues in the hopes of being “rewarded”
under the pilot program. Certain commentators are likely to then proclaim
the pilot program a success. However, this line of reasoning completely
misses the point that business organizations were often voluntarily
disclosing prior to the pilot program.
Rather, the key issue to track is whether the pilot program is motivating
voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA violations that did not occur prior to
the pilot program. It will be impossible to empirically measure this issue.
Likewise, it will be difficult (if not impossible) to assess whether the DOJ is
acting consistent with the pilot program for the reasons discussed above
regarding how the final sentencing guidelines amount is the product of, and
contingent upon, several less-than-transparent discretionary calls made by
the DOJ earlier in the sentencing guidelines equation.
The Pilot Program Falls Short of Best Achieving Laudable Goals
The deep gorge in the FCPA enforcement landscape depicted above is a
concerning policy issue and it is a laudable goal of the pilot program to
encourage “companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the
prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement.”228 However, the
226
Recall that under the pilot program, even if a company does not voluntarily disclose it may
receive a 25% credit off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines if it cooperate and remediates.
Mike Koehler, The Numbers Prove that the DOJ’s FCPA Pilot Program is Really Nothing New, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:04 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-numbers-prove-that-the-dojs-fcpapilot-program-is-really-nothing-new/.
227
The following is anecdotal and not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. The
author has been actively involved in the FCPA space for approximately 15 years both as a lawyer in
private practice who conducted FCPA internal investigations around the world and in other professional
capacities. To the author’s knowledge, never once did the DOJ independently find out about the
underlying conduct and in speaking to other FCPA practitioners about this precise topic, it has never
happened to their clients either.
228
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT
PLAN
AND
GUIDANCE
9
(Apr.
5
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download.
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pilot program falls short of best bridging this gorge compared to other
alternatives previously advanced.
Indeed, a supreme irony of the pilot program was that it bore the
signature of Andrew Weissmann, Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section. Prior to
Weissmann assuming this position in January 2015, he was a vocal critic of
various aspects of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program, as well as
corporate criminal liability principles generally. Among other things,
Weissmann advocated for an FCPA compliance defense and stated:
The FCPA should incentivize the company to establish
compliance systems that will actively discourage and detect
bribery, but should also permit companies that maintain such
effective systems to avail themselves of an affirmative defense
to charges of FCPA violations. This is so because in such
countries even if companies have strong compliance systems
in place, a third-party vendor or errant employee may be
tempted to engage in acts that violate the business’s explicit
anti-bribery policies. It is unfair to hold a business criminally
liable for behavior that was neither sanctioned by or known to
the business.229
According to Weissmann, an FCPA compliance defense, as well as the
other FCPA reforms he advocated, were “best suited for Congressional
action.”230 In other words, Weissmann did not believe that changes to DOJ
policy, which is all the pilot program represented, were enough.
Prior to the pilot program, in Fall 2015 the DOJ announced the
appointment of a compliance counsel to assist DOJ prosecutors in evaluating
corporate compliance programs at the time of improper conduct to determine
if fine reductions are warranted.231 Weissmann was widely viewed as being
the architect of this position and stated that a motivation in creating the
position was to “empower a robust compliance function within
organizations.”232 Asked what he “hope[d] to accomplish in general and
specifically to assist the compliance professional,” Weissmann responded:
“I hope that, in seeing how seriously the Department of Justice takes
compliance, we will strengthen the voice of the compliance professionals

229

ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
6–7 (Oct. 2010),
http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/digital_assets/f07abd4c-cf8b-44dd-8151-64cc73cfd56e/76-2Chamber_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Book_s_Book.pdf.
230
Id.
231
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW COMPLIANCE COUNSEL EXPERT RETAINED BY THE DOJ FRAUD
SECTION, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download.
232
Laura Jacobus, DOJ’s Andrew Weissmann and Hui Chen Talk Corporate Compliance in
Exclusive Interview, ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2, 2016, 8:47),
https://www.ethics.org/blogs/laura-jacobus/2016/02/01/doj-interview.
TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM
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and help them get a stronger seat at the table as a key stakeholder in how
businesses are run.”233
Whether it’s the pilot program’s stated goal to “encourage companies to
implement strong anti-corruption compliance programs to prevent and
detect FCPA violations” or to best “empower a robust compliance function
within organizations” and best “strengthen the voice of the compliance
professional [to] help them get a strong seat at the table,”234 Weissmann
should have listened to his former self because his former self seemed to
recognize that the DOJ’s recent announcements were not the best answer to
accomplish its stated goals.
Like several former high-ranking DOJ officials and others, this author
has long argued that an FCPA compliance defense (an actual statutory
amendment, not merely a change in DOJ internal policy) can best allow the
FCPA enforcement agencies to accomplish their stated objectives. The 2012
article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense”
stated:
An FCPA compliance defense will better facilitate the DOJ’s
prosecution of culpable individuals and advance the objectives
of its FCPA enforcement program. At present, business
organizations that learn through internal reporting
mechanisms of rogue employee conduct implicating the FCPA
are often hesitant to report such conduct to the enforcement
authorities. In such situations, business organizations are
rightfully diffident to submit to the DOJ’s opaque,
inconsistent, and unpredictable decision-making process and
are rightfully concerned that its pre-existing FCPA
compliance policies and procedures and its good faith
compliance efforts will not be properly recognized. The end
result is that the DOJ often does not become aware of
individuals who make improper payments in violation of the
FCPA and the individuals are thus not held legally accountable
for their actions. An FCPA compliance defense surely will not
cause every business organization that learns of rogue
employee conduct to disclose such conduct to the enforcement
agencies. However, it is reasonable to conclude that an FCPA
compliance defense will cause more organizations with robust
FCPA compliance policies and procedures to disclose rogue
employee conduct to the enforcement agencies. Thus, an
FCPA compliance defense can better facilitate DOJ
233

Id.
Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
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prosecution of culpable individuals and increase the deterrent
effect of FCPA enforcement actions.235
Another policy objective that a compliance defense can better achieve
compared to the pilot program is increasing “soft enforcement” of the FCPA.
In other words, a compliance defense can best incentivize business
organizations to implement more robust FCPA policies and procedures, and
more robust policies and procedures can reduce instances of improper
conduct and thereby advance the FCPA’s objectives. Critics of an FCPA
compliance defense have ignored its potential “soft enforcement” impact
focusing instead on “hard enforcement” issues, including assertions that the
defense would prove to be unworkable in a contested proceeding or lack
practical value given that business organizations tend not to put the FCPA
enforcement agencies to their burdens of proof.236
Such criticisms of a compliance defense miss the point. In passing the
FCPA, Congress anticipated that the “criminalization of foreign corporate
bribery will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing preventative
mechanism.”237 Likewise, since the FCPA’s earliest days the DOJ has
recognized that the “most efficient means of implementing the FCPA is
voluntary compliance by the American business community.” 238 Indeed,
Weissmann himself has previously stated that FCPA reform should best
motivate compliance “on a daily basis” and “regardless of what the DOJ is
doing.”239
This is precisely what a compliance defense can better accomplish
compared to the pilot program. To best conceptualize this issue, consider
two scenarios:
Scenario A – The existing landscape for at least the past
decade with the underlined language representing the recent
pilot program and DOJ compliance counsel position.
Scenario B – The landscape if the FCPA were amended to
include a compliance defense.
Ask yourself under which scenario is a compliance officer most likely
to receive the budget and internal support to adopt best-in-class FCPA
compliance policies?
235
Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 609, 659 (2012) (citation omitted).
236
Thomas R. Fox, Why a Compliance Defense Will Not Make Compliance Program Effective,
FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (2013), http://fcpacompliancereport.com/2013/09/why-a-compliancedefense-will-not-make-a-compliance-program-effective/.
237
S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
238
Philip B. Heyman, Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Violations of For. Corrupt
Practices Act, AM. BANKER 4 (Nov. 21, 1979).
239
Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm.
on Crime & Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of Andrew
Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP).
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Scenario A
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to devote
to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, if anything ever happens within our
business organization, an effective FCPA compliance program can lessen
the impact of our legal liability.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on FCPA compliance
will not eliminate our legal exposure, but the DOJ and SEC have said that
the existence of an effective compliance program may perhaps lower our
criminal or civil fine or penalty amount and perhaps even persuade an
enforcement attorney to go lightly on us in case our compliance program is
ever circumvented by an employee. Indeed, the DOJ recently announced in
non-binding guidance that it may offer us a criminal fine reduction to the
extent we voluntarily disclose the conduct, cooperate with the enforcement
agencies, and remediate. Moreover, the DOJ recently announced that it has
a compliance consultant on its staff who is going to assist DOJ prosecutors
in evaluating our compliance program at the time of the improper conduct
to see if we should include qualify for a fine reduction.
Scenario B
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to devote
to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, an effective FCPA compliance
program can reduce our legal exposure as a matter of law.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on investing in FCPA
best practices will be relevant as a matter of law. In other words, if we make
good faith efforts to comply with the FCPA when doing business in the
international marketplace, we will not face any legal exposure when a nonexecutive employee or agent acts contrary to our compliance policies and/or
circumvents our policies.
Most compliance professionals are likely to answer the above question
by saying that Scenario B will best allow the compliance officer to receive
the budget and support needed to most effectively do his/her job.240
An FCPA compliance defense will not magically result in 100% bestin-class FCPA compliance in all business organizations or cause all business
240
For instance, the author runs the FCPA Institute (a two-day active learning experience for FCPA
professionals such as in-house counsel and compliance professionals from leading companies, lawyers
in private practice, as well as other compliance and business professionals) and every time the above
scenario has been used, Scenario B has been the unanimous answer.
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organizations to disclose all FCPA violations. However, the DOJ
announcement of a pilot program in 2016 and prior to that a compliance
counsel position were not the best answers if the DOJ’s true goals are to
encourage “companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the
prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement” and to best
“empower a robust compliance function within organizations” and best
“strengthen the voice of the compliance professional [to] help them get a
strong seat at the table.”
The Pilot Program in Practice
Since the release of the pilot program in April 2016 through the end of
2016, the DOJ has self-identified five corporate matters resolved through socalled declinations consistent with the pilot program: Nortek, Akamai
Technologies, Johnson Controls, HMT LLC, and NCH Corp.241
Nevertheless, these instances raise more questions than answers concerning
the pilot program.
For starters, none of the five instances were “pure” voluntary disclosures
“pursuant” to the pilot program. In other words, all of the companies
disclosed and were under FCPA scrutiny prior to April 2016. Moreover,
three of the instances (Nortek, Akamai, and Johnson Controls) merely
reference “possible” FCPA violations and the salient question needs to be
asked: just what viable criminal charges did the DOJ actually decline?242
Based on the information in the public domain (the SEC’s related civil
administrative actions against the companies) the answer appears to be none,
and the three instances would appear to be attempts by the DOJ to market
its nascent pilot program.243
The other two instances the DOJ self-identified as being resolved
through so-called declinations consistent with the pilot program were HMT
and NCH and these matters were materially different than the prior three
examples in at least three respects.

241
Declinations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/pilot-program/declinations.
242
Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section,
to Luke Cadigan (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865406/download; Letter
from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, to Ryan
Rohlfsen (June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865411/download; Letter from
Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, to Jay Holtmeier
(June 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/874566/download.
243
For additional analysis, see Mike Koehler, Nortek/Akamai—Don’t Believe the Hype, Rather Ask
What Viable Criminal Charges Did The DOJ Actually Decline?, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 9, 2016, 12:04
AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/nortek-akamai-just-what-charges-did-the-doj-decline/; Mike Koehler,
Once Again, Don’t Believe the Hype—Rather Ask What Viable Criminal Charges Against Johnson
Controls Did the DOJ Actually Decline, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 12, 2016, 12:03 AM),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/dont-believe-hype/.
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First and most important is that HMT and NCH paid money “pursuant
to” declination letters whereas Nortek, Akamai Technologies, and Johnson
Controls did not. Specifically, HMT agreed to disgorge approximately $2.7
million244 and NCH agreed to disgorge approximately $335,000.245 Second,
the prior three examples occurred against the backdrop of SEC enforcement
actions against the issuer companies. However, HMT and NCH were both
private business organizations not subject to SEC jurisdiction and thus the
only information in the public domain is the information in the DOJ’s letters.
Perhaps because of this difference, the HMT and NCH letters were
comparatively more substantive than the prior three examples. Third, and
presumably the reason for the first difference noted above, the prior three
examples involved “possible” FCPA violations that left significant open
questions about whether any actual viable FCPA criminal violations were
actually declined. However, the HMT and NCH letters (certain statute of
limitations issues aside) seemingly articulate viable FCPA violations against
the companies based on the DOJ’s current enforcement theories.
Despite this material difference, the HMT and NCH “declination with
disgorgement” letters were nevertheless concerning because the DOJ
literally invented a new way to enforce the FCPA. In terms of historical
background, from 1977 to 2004 there were only two ways in which the DOJ
resolved alleged instances of corporate FCPA scrutiny: it either charged the
company or it did not charge the company. In late 2004 and thereafter, the
DOJ brought non-prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution
agreements, neither of which are mentioned in the FCPA, to the FCPA
context. In April 2016, with release of the pilot program, the DOJ formally
unveiled so-called “declinations” and in September 2016 the DOJ unveiled
in the HMT and NCH matters declinations with disgorgement. In many
respects, DOJ enforcement of the FCPA has strayed from traditional law
enforcement to something akin to a buffet line.
The HMT and NCH matters are all the more concerning because the
FCPA explicitly provides the DOJ a non-criminal option for enforcing the
FCPA against non-issuer companies such as HMT and NCH. For instance,
both the 78dd-2 prong of the FCPA (applicable to “domestic concerns”—
FCPA-speak for all forms of U.S. business organizations not issuers and
U.S. nationals) and the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA (applicable to “persons
other than issuers or domestic concerns”—FCPA-speak for foreign
companies not issuers and foreign nationals) specifically authorize the DOJ
to bring civil actions for FCPA violations.
244
Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section,
to Steven A. Tyrrell, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/899116/download.
245
Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section
to Paul E. Coggins and Kiprian Mendrygal, Locke Lord LLP (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899121/download.
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Section 78dd-2(d) under the heading “Injunctive Relief” specifically
states in pertinent part:
(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic
concern to which this section applies, or officer, director,
employee, agent, or stockholder thereof, is engaged, or about
to engage, in any act or practice constituting a violation of
subsection (a) or (i) of this section, the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and
upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a temporary
restraining order shall be granted without bond. . . . All process
in any such case may be served in the judicial district in which
such person resides or may be found. The Attorney General
may make such rules relating to civil investigations as may be
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this
subsection.246
Between 1991 and 2001, the DOJ resolved four corporate FCPA
enforcement actions consistent with this express statutory authority.247
While four enforcement actions over a 10-year period may not sound like
many, there were only eleven DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions
between 1991 and 2001.248 Thus, the four enforcement actions comprised
36% of all DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions during this time frame.
When asked why the DOJ has stopped civilly enforcing the FCPA, the
DOJ’s press office simply responded: “We decline to comment. Thank
you.”249 Among the many other policy concerns raised by the DOJ’s pilot
program discussed above, the HMT and NCH “declinations with
disgorgement” present the additional issue that perhaps instead of creating
new ways to enforce the FCPA not even mentioned in the statute, the DOJ
should enforce the FCPA in ways expressly authorized by Congress.
As mentioned above, it is impossible to empirically measure various
aspects of the pilot program. However, it is possible to assess whether a
“main goal” of the pilot program is working, and at present, the undeniable
answer is that the pilot program is currently failing. In the pilot program, the
DOJ clearly stated that a “main goal” of the program is to use voluntarily
disclosures to learn about information that will allow it to prosecute
individuals. Specifically, the pilot program states: “[T]his pilot program is
intended to encourage companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit
246

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) (1), (3) (1998).
Mike Koehler, Why Has the DOJ Stopped Civilly Enforcing The FCPA?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Mar. 23, 2017, 12:03 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-stopped-civilly-enforcing-fcpa/.
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the prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement.”250
At the DOJ’s April 2016 Pilot Program press conference, Assistant
Attorney General Leslie Caldwell stated that the goal of the “pilot program”
is to “encourage self-reporting” because companies have information about
individuals who have violated the FCPA and have documents relevant to
FCPA violations. According to Caldwell, the goal of the program is to
“encourage” companies to give the DOJ this information. In subsequent
public comments, Caldwell stated:
[The] idea of the Pilot Program, in part, is get the company to
self-report by giving it some incentives so that when it comes
in and self-reports, it will give us the information that it has . .
. that will in turn enable us to prosecute individuals because
we recognize that prosecution of individuals is the biggest
deterrent . . . to corporate wrongdoing, and criminal
wrongdoing . . . that is really one of the main goals of the Pilot
Program.251
Likewise, Caldwell stated:
We want that information because we want to be able to make
cases against those individuals, but we don’t have that
evidence . . . [the idea of the pilot program] is to get that
information that we know is out there about culpable
individuals so that we can make the cases against culpable
individuals. Companies can’t go to jail. Individuals can . . . and
the biggest deterrent to wrongdoing is prosecuting
individuals.252
Measuring this “main goal” is fairly easy by comparing the corporate
resolutions that the DOJ has self-identified as being resolved consistent with
the pilot program and then seeing whether there have been any individual
prosecutions related to those matters. As highlighted above, the DOJ has
self-identified five corporate matters as being resolved consistent with the
pilot program (Nortek, Akamai Technologies, Johnson Controls, HMT LLC,
and NCH Corp) and none of these matters have involved, at least yet,
prosecution of individuals. Thus, measured against the DOJ’s own “main
goal” of its pilot program, the program is currently failing.

250
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 9 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/838386/download.
251
Assistant AG Caldwell on the DOJ’s Pilot Program (C-SPAN 2 television broadcast Nov. 4,
2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4629540/assistant-ag-caldwell-dojs-pilot-program.
252
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The year 2016 was certainly a record-breaking year for FCPA
enforcement and it is hoped that this article has highlighted various
quantitative and qualitative issues of value to anyone seeking to elevate their
FCPA knowledge. Yet, as the FCPA approaches its 40th anniversary, many
legal and policy issues surround FCPA enforcement that need to be
addressed if the FCPA is to best achieve its laudable goals of reducing
bribery in ways consistent with the rule of law.

